Business Models for Extracting the Value of Flexibility in Electricity Systems: A Contractual and Market Based Approach by Vatn, Hege Grønning & Berntsen, Stine Anette
Business Models for Extracting the Value 
of Flexibility in Electricity Systems
A Contractual and Market Based Approach
Stine Anette Berntsen
Hege Grønning Vatn
Industrial Economics and Technology Management
Supervisor: Asgeir Tomasgard, IØT
Co-supervisor: Stig Ødegaard Ottesen, IØT
Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management
Submission date: June 2014
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
 






Preface
This thesis concludes our Master’s degree in Managerial Economics and Operations Re-
search and Investment, Finance and Financial Management under the Department of
Industrial Economics and Technology Management at the Norwegian University of Sci-
ence and Technology. It was written during the spring of 2014.
The main topic of the study was proposed to us by our supervisors in the Fall 2013.
The thesis is based on the authors interest for the energy market, and we hope that our
analyses and discussions can support future decision making processes and shed light on
some of the market opportunities of demand side flexibility in the future energy market.
The working process has been very educational and exciting as the subjects have (to our
knowledge) previously not been addressed.
First of all we would like to thank our supervisor at the department, Asgeir Tomas-
gard, for both his time and guidance, keeping the work on the right track. Huge thanks
should also go to Stig Ø. Ottesen for introducing us to important people in the research
field and his informative advising. We would also like to thank Therese Troset Engan
and Jan Andor Foosnæs at NTE Nett AS, Virginia Hyde at Statnett R&D and finally
Eilert Bjerkan at Enfo Consulting AS for their time and helpful information.
Trondheim, June 2014
Stine Anette Berntsen Hege Grønning Vatn
i

Abstract
The Nordic electricity system faces several challenges, and demand side flexibility will
be a key factor for securing reliable and e cient electricity supply. The aim of this
thesis was to elaborate both contractual and market-based business models for releasing
potential of demand side flexibility. Opportunities for several participants on the de-
mand side as well as the supply side were emphasized. The thesis attempted to evaluate
various business models both from the perspective of each individual participant and
the whole society. In order to analyze factors impacting the business models, costs and
benefits of flexibility were quantified. Further, illustrative studies of each business model
were performed to highlight the theoretical analyses. An aggregator was introduced to
explore how an intermediary party a↵ects the overall value creation of flexibility as well
as the allocation of this value. Finally, the thesis proposed future solutions for employing
su cient flexibility to the electricity systems.
The analyses indicated that the various business models have important characteris-
tics required to manage di↵erent challenges in the trading of flexibility. Bilateral con-
tracts enable trade of this resource at an early stage where few buyers and suppliers
participate in addition to provide tailored solutions to solve specific problems in the
electricity system. However, from a socio-economic perspective bilateral trading often
results in sub-optimality as each individual participant designs contracts by maximizing
own profit. Local flexibility markets enable su ciently supply and demand and increase
the overall e ciency. Nevertheless, several barriers must be overcome to facilitate trad-
ing in markets. Both trading approaches are vulnerable to dominating actors which
is a potential problem in flexibility markets. The illustrative studies implied that grid
companies have significantly higher benefits of flexibility than retailers and wind power
producers, which exclude these two buyers from trading. This diminishes the released
potential of flexibility. A large aggregator changes the divisions of power in the system
and acts as a driving force to retrieve supply of flexibility. By doing so, the aggregator
can facilitate trading for additional buyers as the grid companies have limited demands
of flexibility. The results implied several business opportunities for the aggregator where
a combined model can ensure optimal exploitation of his flexibility portfolio. Compre-
hensive load scheduling models are required to find an optimal allocation. In order to
realize the whole potential of demand side flexibility, both contractual and market-based
models might be required.
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Sammendrag
Det nordiske kraftsystemet st˚ar overfor flere utfordringer, og fleksibilitet p˚a etterspørsels-
siden vil være en nøkkelfaktor for a˚ sikre p˚alitelig og e↵ektiv strømforsyning. Ma˚let med
denne masteroppgaven var a˚ utdype b˚ade kontrakts- og markedsbaserte forretningsmod-
eller for a˚ realisere potensialet til sluttbrukerfleksibilitet. Muligheter p˚a b˚ade tilbud- og
etterspørselssiden ble vektlagt. Masteroppgaven studerte ulike forretningsmodeller b˚ade
fra perspektivet til hver enkelt aktør og for samfunnet som helhet. For a˚ analysere fak-
torer som p˚avirker forretningsmodellene, ble kostnadene og gevinstene av fleksibilitet
kvantifisert. Videre ble det utført enkle, numeriske beregninger for a˚ underbygge de
teoretiske analysene. En aggregator ble innført for a˚ utforske hvordan en tredjepart kan
p˚avirke den samlede verdiskapingen av fleksibilitet, samt fordelingen av denne. Mas-
teroppgaven foreslo til slutt fremtidige løsninger for a˚ utnytte fleksibiliteten optimalt.
Analysene viste at de ulike forretningsmodellene innehar viktige egenskaper som kreves
for a˚ h˚andtere ulike utfordringer ved handel av fleksibilitet. Bilaterale kontrakter mulig-
gjør handel av denne ressursen p˚a et tidlig stadium der f˚a kjøpere og leverandører deltar, i
tillegg til a˚ tilby skreddersydde løsninger for a˚ løse spesifikke problemer i kraftsystemet.
Likevel vil bilaterale kontrakter ofte resultere i sub-optimalitet sett fra et samfunns-
økonomisk perspektiv der hver enkelt deltaker designer kontrakter ved a˚ maksimere
egen profitt. Lokale fleksibilitetsmarkeder muliggjør tilstrekkelig tilbud og etterspørsel
av fleksibilitet og øker den totale e↵ektiviteten. Likevel ma˚ flere barrierer overkommes
for a˚ tilrettelegge for handel i fleksibilitetsmarkedet. Begge handlema˚tene er s˚arbare
for dominerende aktører, og kan være et problem i energimarkedet. De numeriske
beregningene antydet at nettselskapene har betydelig høyere gevinst av fleksibilitet enn
strømleverandører og vindkraftprodusenter, noe som vil forhindre disse kjøperne fra a˚
delta i markedet, slik at det utnyttede potensialet av fleksibilitet reduseres. En ag-
gregator endrer maktbalansen i systemet og fungerer som en p˚adriver for a˚ hente ut
tilgjengelig fleksibilitet. Dermed kan aggregator tilrettelegge for flere kjøpere ettersom
nettselskapene har begrenset behov og derav etterspørsel av fleksibilitet. Resultatene
viste flere forretningsmuligheter for aggregator der blant annet en kombinert modell kan
sikre optimal utnyttelse av fleksibilitetsporteføljen. Omfattende lastplanleggingsmod-
eller vil være nødvendige for a˚ sikre en optimal allokering av porteføljen til en aggrega-
tor eller en kjøper av fleksibilitet. B˚ade kontraksbaserte og markedsbaserte modeller er
nødvendige for a˚ hente ut hele potensialet av sluttbrukerfleksibilitet.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Nordic electricity system is undergoing significant changes. Stakeholders in the en-
ergy sector must find new ways of operating their businesses to meet challenges as aging
infrastructure, increasing integration of energy production from intermittent sources,
rising energy consumption and new technology influencing how electricity is consumed
today. In Norway, the use of electrical vehicles is rapidly increasing, which concerns the
operators of the distribution grids as they face high irregular consumption peaks from
charging. The changing consumption patterns of end-users require the electrical grid to
be dimensioned for high peak load capacity, occurring only a few hours in a year.
Electricity is a special type of commodity as it cannot easily be stored. Hence, the
electricity system must be balanced continuously, meaning demand must equal supply
at all time. Flexibility is needed in order to maintain balance in the future electricity
system. In the present system flexibility is provided by large producers, but recently the
focus has been shifted towards the consumption side and its ability to deliver flexibility.
Demand side flexibility has been introduced as a possible solution to the above men-
tioned challenges, and by providing the right incentives that induce end-users to engage
in demand response programs, a variety of problems among di↵erent actors in the elec-
tricity system can be solved. Demand side participation requires smarter networks, thus
smart grid technology is vital to enable comprehensive interactions. Increased demand
side flexibility holds substantial potential of benefits for the whole energy system. By
exploiting flexibility, grid companies and Transmission System Operators, henceforth re-
ferred as TSO, can ensure continuous power flow and maintain a reliable power supply,
while producers of intermittent energy sources or retailers can reduce financial risk by
lowering costs associated with imbalances. From the perspective of an aggregator, as a
new market entrant, demand side flexibility can provide important business opportuni-
ties and thus a potential of gaining high profits.
As the complexity of the future energy system is increasing, new arrangements between
the market actors are needed [10]. The aim of this thesis is to present various ways
in which demand side flexibility can be traded, and investigate how the full potential
1
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of flexibility can be released in order to deliver benefits to all actors in the electricity
system. Theoretical frameworks will be presented and the results analyzed while simul-
taneously linking the study to reality. Both a contractual and market-based approach
will be investigated in order to suggest novel business models that can solve problems
arising and at the same time be profitable for the market participants. Future solutions
for trading flexibility will be proposed including an aggregator possessing incentives to
facilitate the changes required. This work highlights both how single actors can exploit
flexibility to maximize individual profits, and how market-based solutions can maximize
the total socio-economic gain. Illustrative examples will be presented throughout the
whole thesis to support the discussions.
Previous research mainly focuses on new technology and how to provide economic incen-
tives for end-users to participate in demand side flexibility programs. The studies often
emphasize how grid companies and TSOs can exploit flexibility. So far, less focus has
been on solutions including all actors in the electricity system and how they can gain
from demand side flexibility. This thesis studies the electricity system as a whole, and
by doing so, great knowledge about various business opportunities is obtained. Usually
only one trading method is considered, but here both contractual and market-based solu-
tions will be studied, as well as the trade-o↵ between these in a combined business model.
In order to limit the scope of the thesis, only the Norwegian electricity system is con-
sidered. However, the main findings can be applied to electricity systems in general and
might even serve a greater value to some of them. The interactions in the electricity
market are complex and thus a simplified value chain will be analyzed. For instance, the
TSO and grid companies face many similar challenges associated with operating the grid,
and for this reason only grid companies are emphasized1. Dynamic electricity and grid
tari↵s have previously been suggested to induce end-users in demand response programs.
These pricing schemes are not within the scope of this thesis, instead additional incen-
tives for suppliers and buyers of flexibility will be introduced. Selected contract types
will be investigated in order to determine how actors can exploit the value of flexibility
by engaging in contractual relationships. The chosen contracts hold di↵erent properties
and serve as good examples on how various information scenarios impact the contract
design. It should be emphasized that the numerical calculations performed are for illus-
trative purposes only. However, the trends in the calculations serve as good indications
of the principals in general. Complete calculations can be found in attached Excel-files.
If otherwise stated, the calculations are based on an hourly time-frame, which means
that all prices and profits are calculated per hour. It should be stressed that the hours
studied are peak load hours with high demand of flexibility, and thus the calculations are
not representative for all hours in a year. A snapshot of the situations will be studied,
and hence the flexibility is measured in kWh/h or kW as denoted in this thesis.
1Previous research has paid most attention to the TSOs and how they can benefit from demand side
flexibility
2
The thesis is divided into seven main chapters. Chapter 2 provides a brief presenta-
tion of the Norwegian power market followed by a description of the term flexibility
as well as identifies potential buyers and suppliers of flexibility. In Chapter 3, cost and
benefit functions of flexibility for buyers and suppliers are derived and estimated in order
to support decision making processes. Further, Chapter 4 and 5 present a theoretical
framework of trading flexibility in contracts and markets respectively by studying a sim-
plified value chain. Both chapters include simple numerical calculations and discussions
on how these models can be applied to the electricity system. Chapter 6 introduces
an aggregator and based on previous analyses elaborates di↵erent business models for
flexibility. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
3
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Chapter 2
The Norwegian Power Market
The Norwegian power market has changed considerably in recent decades. In 1991 an
Energy Act was introduced to encourage increased competition in those parts of the
energy sector that could not be regarded as natural monopolies. Nevertheless, there is
little doubt that the energy market is about to change even more. Smart Grid technol-
ogy brings along several opportunities that can change the whole value chain of todays
market and flexibility from the demand side will play a key role in this change. It is
expected that the future will bring more actors and new functionalities into the mar-
ket. Existing roles will change, and new services and market opportunities will arise.
The classic grid companies and retailers are likely to be complemented by new types
of actors, like aggregators and other service providers. Companies participating in the
energy sector today can broaden their commercial range of o↵erings by taking on new
roles, but they may also face increased competition from new actors entering the market.
In order to analyze business models that extract and utilize the value of demand side
flexibility, present market mechanisms as well as both existing and new actors is pre-
sented. The primary intention of this chapter is to give the reader an overview of the
Norwegian power market and present how flexibility is introduced to this market. The
first section gives a description of the present market design. Section 2.2 elaborates the
term flexibility in more detail, while Section 2.3 presents possible suppliers and buyers
of flexibility. Finally, Section 2.4 gives a brief overview of related research. Major parts
of the theory presented in this chapter is based on work previous work by the authors
given in [4].
2.1 Market Design
Electricity production are based on a range of di↵erent energy sources, from non-
renewable resources as coal and gas, to renewable resources as wind, solar and hydro.
Some production sources are possible to control, like hydro power or gas fired power
plants, whereas intermittent energy sources are not. In Norway 99 percent of the en-
ergy production comes from hydro power [29] and hence, electricity contribute to the
5
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largest share of the energy consumption in Norway. The electricity is transported by
the transmission network to substations located close to end-users. Grid companies are
responsible for the local grid and provide electricity to end-users. Since building several
distribution networks would not be socio-economic profitable, they are in a position of
natural monopolies. Retailers, or power suppliers, buy electricity through the spot mar-
ket and re-sell it through the retail market by o↵ering the end-users a range of di↵erent
contracts; fixed-price, variable-price or spot price. The retailers are responsible for the
terms of power delivery including the price of electricity paid by the end-users. End-
users can choose between retailers charging them for electricity, but not between grid
companies charging the network tari↵.
Market!
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Operator!
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Figure 2.1: Bidding sequence in the Nordic power market.
Electricity di↵ers from other commodities by having certain characteristics. One of the
main challenges is that the electrical system has to be in balance at all time, which means
that production and consumption have to coincide in every second. An unbalanced elec-
trical system can cause real damage and if the unbalance continues over a longer time
period there is a risk of system break down [10]. In order to provide enough power in
the electricity system at all time there has to be a su cient amount of available power
production and flexibility in the system. The large production of electricity as well as
the fact that electricity generally have to be consumed as it is generated1 make the
Nordic power market complex, and large volumes are traded daily. Su cient reserves of
electricity are important to secure reliability in the system. The power market consists
of multiple market places and market participants, and it operates over di↵erent time
horizons from long-term to short-term, until real-time. Figure 2.1 illustrates the Nordic
power market design including the time frame.
In order to overcome the challenge of balancing the whole electricity system at any
time three electricity markets exist at an overall level: a day-ahead market, an intra-day
1Electricity is di cult to store in large quantities and storage are not yet economical e cient.
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market and an ancillary service market. In the day-ahead market, Elspot, electricity is
traded for each hour of the following day. If the market players are not able to realize
the volumes traded day-ahead, bids can be placed in the intra-day market, Elbas, until
one hour before the hour of operation. Elbas is based on continuous auctioning, and
prices are set based on a first-come, first-served principle. So far, the turnover volumes
in Elbas are relatively small, but this market is becoming increasingly important as more
renewable power enters the grid. In the delivery hour, ancillary services provided by the
Balancing Market are activated to compensate for any system imbalances. The largest
turnovers in the Nordic system are in the day-ahead market and the Balancing Market
for regulating power [5]. When describing new business models for exploiting the value
of flexibility in electricity markets it is most interesting to study the markets where it
is assumed that the flexibility is valued the most, and hence the focus in this thesis will
be on the day-ahead market and the reserve markets.
2.1.1 The Spot Market
Nord Pool Spot runs the leading power market in Europe and is the market operator
of both the day-ahead and the intraday market. Nord Pool Spot is responsible for both
physical and financial trade in the Nordic market. Today around 370 companies from
20 countries trade in the spot market and in 2012 the total turnover was 432 TWh [23].
All participants at Nord Pool Spot have to pay an annual fixed fee of 15 000 EUR. In
addition the variable fee for trading in Elbas is 0,11 EUR/MWh and the corresponding
fee for Elspot is 0,04 EUR/MWh [22]. Nord Pool Spot is geographically divided into
di↵erent areas indicating that the grid has transfer capacity limits, and based on these
limitations di↵erent area prices will occur to reflect the regional market conditions. The
system price serves as a reference price for the financial power trade and is calculated by
aggregated supply and demand for the Nordic system, assuming no transfer limitations
in the grid.
The main activity of Nord Pool Spot is operation of the short-term physical electricity
market. Elspot is Nord Pool’s auction based day-ahead market and the main arena for
trading power in the Nordic region. Today there are around 360 buyers and sellers,
called members, on Elspot and most of them trade every day, placing a total of around
2000 orders for power contracts on a daily basis [20]. As the Market Operator, Elspot
is responsible for receiving bids for sales and purchases of electricity. There are three
di↵erent types of orders that can be placed: single hourly orders, block orders and
flexible orders. The members can decide to use one or a combination of the order types.
The deadline for submitting bids for power delivered the following day is at noon. The
power price is then determined by matching the hourly supply and demand for each
price area, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. Once the market prices have been calculated and
announced to the market around 12:30 pm, all trades are settled. The power contracts
are physically delivered hour by hour according to the contracts the next day.
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Figure 2.2: Market clearing in Elspot.
2.1.2 The Balancing Market
The Balancing Market is operated by Statnett, as the TSO in Norway, and serves as
a tool to balance power generation and load at any time during the hour of operation.
The Balancing Market is thus a collection of regulating objects to compensate for any
imbalance between production and demand during the operating phase. Participants in
this market are electricity producers and large consumers that can easily adjust their
production and/or consumption in a short time note. The TSO’s expenses for regulating
power are financed via the balancing power traded with the balance responsible party
that caused the imbalances.
The Balancing Market is operated in two phases, a bidding phase and a calculating
phase. During the bidding phase the participants, both supply side and demand side,
place bids stating hourly volume and price of upward regulation2 or downward regula-
tion3. Bids to the Balancing Market for the following day are to be submitted before
7:30 pm. The minimum quantity is 10 MW and the bidder must be able to provide the
o↵ered quantity within 15 minutes [30]. The regulating price is determined in the oper-
ational hour by the TSO by activating the bids in merit order as shown in Figure 2.3.
The highest activated bid determines the balancing price. The upward regulating price
is equal to or higher than the spot price, and the downward regulating price is equal to
or lower than the spot price. When the operational hour has passed, all metered data
are collected and the imbalances for all participants are determined in the calculating
phase. The individual participant is charged or credited for his power imbalances, based
on the prices in the Balancing Market.
2Increased generation or reduced consumption
3decreased generation or increased consumption
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Figure 2.3: Upward and downward regulating prices in the Balancing Market. Adapted
from [35].
2.1.3 The Reserve Option Market
The Reserve Option Market (ROM) was introduced to the Norwegian power market
when the balance became narrower and the balancing reserves were not su cient to
cover the capacity needed in the Balancing Market [35]. The Reserve Option Market
makes sure that there are always large enough reserves available to cover possible short-
ness of power by o↵ering payments for availability of reserves. This is a capacity market
where the suppliers are paid an option price to guarantee participation in the Balancing
Market with a predefined volume of power. The need for ensuring su cient upward
regulating power in the Balancing Market has so far mainly occurred during the winter
season in Norway4. Power from both generation and demand side flexibility can be sub-
mitted in the Reserve Option Market. The participants submit hourly bids on price and
volume of flexibility in consumption or production. These bids must be linked to their
corresponding price area. The reserves should be available on a certain time of the day
and the minimum volume is set by the requirements in the Balancing Market. All the
bids within one region are awarded at the same price through a price clearing process
where the option price is determined as the price of the last o↵er accepted. A market
participant with an option contract is obliged to make the reserved quantity available
by bidding into the Balancing Market [12].
Two di↵erent products are traded in the Reserve Option Market. The products are
called ROM-season and ROM-week. In ROM-season the options are traded with a du-
ration of the entire season, meaning that the submitted power must be available in the
Balancing Market during the whole ROM-season. Options in ROM-season should be
traded before the startup of the first ROM-week, usually around October 1. The prices
4Specifically October through April
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in ROM-season have increased the last seasons.
The duration of options in ROM-week are one week in lieu of the whole season. Bids
on this product have to be submitted within Friday at noon before the week of oper-
ation. The results, i.e. power and option price, are announced at 2 pm the same day.
Accepted power have to be available in the Balancing Market during the whole period
of the option.
2.2 Flexibility in Electricity Systems
Flexibility in the electricity systems will be a key factor to both meet rising demand and
at the same time have large enough reserves to maintain system reliability. This section
will explain how the term flexibility is defined and used in this thesis and why flexibility
in electricity systems is needed.
2.2.1 Definition of flexibility
Flexibility in electricity systems is described as flexible production and consumption of
electricity and can be provided by either the supply side or the demand side. Several
parameters are used to characterize flexibility in electricity systems including the amount
of power modulation, the duration, the rate of change, the response time and the location
[10]. Most of the flexibility today is provided by the supply side and a few large industry
consumers, while the demand side is treated as price takers with inelastic demands that
should be met. New technology and restructured electricity systems enable the demand
side to provide flexibility to the system. In 2000 the the potential for demand side
flexibility in Norway was estimated to 4 000 MW in the heavy industry sector and about
1 700 MW in the residential sector, which in total amounts to around 20 % of the peak
load [12]. However, technology alone is not enough to bring along the changes that
are needed. Most of the demand side flexibility is still unreleased potential. Future
challenges for the system require more available flexibility, and thus flexibility from the
demand side should be exploited to e ciently operate the electricity system and increase
the competition. In order to do so, electricity consumers’ behavior must change. The
focus in this thesis will therefore be on flexibility from the demand side. Further in the
thesis, flexibility is defined as flexible consumption or production only from the demand
side. Hence, flexible generation of electricity o↵ered by power producers is not included
in the term flexibility here.
2.2.2 Demand side flexibility
The main objective of demand side flexibility is to improve the overall e ciency of
the whole energy system [10]. The demand side can o↵er flexibility to the markets in
several ways. For instance the demand side can react to spot prices in the spot market,
or they can activate flexibility resources for balancing purposes and ancillary services.
Flexibility can be provided by reducing and increasing as well as shifting consumption
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or production5 when needed. Consumers with generation available is often referred to
prosumers6, meaning that they are both consumers and producers. A common term for
consumers providing flexibility is demand response. [33] defines demand response as:
Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their normal consump-
tion patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or to
incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high
wholesale market prices or when system reliability is jeopardized.
To encourage the market to respond when need for flexibility arises, e cient price signals
in the form of both dynamic grid tari↵s and real-time pricing of electricity is crucial.
The price of electricity will reflect the costs of supplying electricity under such price
signals and will make the real cost transparent to the demand side. Thus the benefits of
participating with flexibility become visible for suppliers. The most important incentive
for end-users to be willing to provide flexibility is expected cost savings and economic
gain, and proper price signals will induce economic incentives. The price signals have
di↵erent characteristics in Elspot and the Balancing Market. In the Balancing Market,
the flexibility is initiated by call from the TSO when steady frequency deviation occurs
in real time operation. On the other hand, flexibility in the spot market is initiated by
the 24-hour price setting for the day ahead [12]. The authors, and other researchers7,
believe that price signals provide insu cient economic incentives for small suppliers to
activate flexibility. This thesis will propose additional economic incentives to suppliers in
the form of payments from either a contractual relationship or from flexibility markets.
Volume!
Pr
ice
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Demand!DemandDR!
Q!QDR!
Price!
reduction!
Figure 2.4: Elasticity of electricity demand. Adapted from [1].
5Some consumers have small scale production installed which can be switched on or o↵.
6In the following, end-users will be referred to as suppliers of flexibility. It is not explicitly defined
whether they have available generation or not. If it is necessary for the analysis the two terms will be
separated.
7For instance [8].
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If the electricity system succeeds to o↵er su cient incentives to end-users and they
provide flexibility, the elasticity of demand will increase. [27] explains that the elastic-
ity of demand is given by the flexibility of consumers to change demand in response to
changes in price or other monetary incentives. [17] uses microeconomic theory to state
that consumers of electricity, like consumers of all other commodities, will increase their
demand up to the point where the marginal benefit they derive from the electricity is
equal to the price they have to pay. Pilot studies in Norway carried out by [13] have
shown a significant demand side response in high price periods, which means that there
is certain demand side price elasticity when the conditions are right and the right incen-
tives are given.
As illustrated in Figure 2.4 the spot market face steep bid curves in peak load peri-
ods, and there is a danger that price setting can fail in an extreme shortage situation.
An elastic demand curve can lower the market price significantly, and only a small price
dependent load reduction will result in a substantial drop in price. [13] states that suf-
ficient flexibility in peak hours will reduce not only the high prices, but also the average
price over time.
2.3 Suppliers and Buyers of Flexibility
The present value chain in the electricity system consists of buyers of electricity on one
hand, and various power actors on the other. This thesis will analyze a value chain
for the commodity flexibility in lieu of electricity, where flexibility can be traded as a
virtual resource. In this value chain the end-users are the suppliers rather than buyers
as in the traditional electricity value chain. Grid companies, the TSO, retailers and
producers of renewable energy sources are potential buyers of flexibility. The value chain
as seen in Figure 2.5 will be explored throughout this thesis. First, the value chain is
analyzed without any intermediary party between the buyers and suppliers. Further, an
aggregator as an intermediary will be introduced. As the name indicate, an aggregator
aggregates flexibility bought from the suppliers and resell the flexibility to the various
buyers either through contracts or markets.
2.3.1 Suppliers of flexibility
There are several ways to classify suppliers of flexibility. Three di↵erent types of suppli-
ers are considered based on their activity and typical electricity load profile; industrial
suppliers, commercial business suppliers and household suppliers. Each segment of sup-
pliers8 represents di↵erent load profiles and thus di↵erent potential for demand response.
The flexibility potential is greatest in electrical appliances that need significant power
and are used for large periods of time. Thus, thermal appliances often represent large
potential of flexibility. In the Nordic countries the electricity consumption peaks take
place during the coldest hours of the year, and thermal appliances are thus important.
8Notice that suppliers of flexibility also are consumers of electricity.
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Figure 2.5: Value chain for flexibility.
Each segment’s potential for providing flexibility is defined by their electricity load pro-
files which is briefly described in the following. Figure 2.6 shows the share of total
consumption in Norway for each segment [3].
Industrial consumers are typically large actors with high electricity consumption, es-
pecially in energy intensive industry. They are often able to switch their production
patterns to take advantage of low electricity prices in o↵-peak hours. Similarly, many of
them have power generation units or heat facilities that enable them to respond to high
electricity prices. Unlike the other groups of consumers, many industry actors are active
participants in the electricity market today. They buy and sell electricity in the spot
market, as well as placing bids of flexible load in the Balancing Market. Large industry
consumers already have incentives to exploit the full potential of flexibility in order to
make their business less dependent on energy prices, reduce their costs and increase their
competitiveness in front of their competitors.
Commercial business consumers represent service industries like o ces, schools, stores,
and hotels and make up around 20 % of total electricity consumption in Norway. Heat-
ing and cooling are the main sources of consumption for this segment. Thus commercial
buildings can be seen as storage resources [9]. The buildings can often be pre-heated
and pre-cooled e ciently, and this flexibility could be exploited. Large commercial busi-
nesses usually have control and management systems for heating and cooling, which
an aggregator or the business itself can exploit to manage demand response. Commer-
cial businesses with large refrigerating appliances have significant potential of flexibility
as refrigerators provide storage solutions. A few incentive-based programs for securing
reserves exist in Norway today for this segment, but only for large commercial consumers.
Household consumers represent private consumers. Energy consumption in households
depends on several factors, like members in the household, outside temperature, living
space and the economy of the household. The energy is used for space heating, water
heating and electricity specific consumption, i.e. lights and electric appliances. Electric-
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ity accounts for around 80 % of the total energy consumption in households. Thermal
appliances with ability to store energy such as water heaters represent the appliances
with largest potential, while the potential of other equipments, such as washing ma-
chines, is smaller and less reliable [10]. Many barriers, making it hard for households
to provide flexibility, exist today as well as very low economic incentives. These must
be removed in order to release the potential of flexibility. Additionally, households need
further development of home automation and smart housing to enable flexibility.
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Figure 2.6: Share of total consumption for each consumer segment.
Micro-generation refers to a wide variety of energy sources, like river or pumped storage
power plants, photovoltaic, wind, biogas or small cogeneration installations [10]. Small-
scale decentralized generation of electricity is expected to expand in the future, and also
small electricity consumers can become prosumers. This will increase the potential to
provide flexibility among suppliers, but will also impose challenges to the distribution
grids which have to be addressed by the grid companies.
2.3.2 Buyers of flexibility
Various market actors with diverse and often contradictory interests are acting within
the energy market, and they may all have an interest in demand side flexibility. The
primary players requesting flexibility are the System Operators, i.e. the TSO and grid
companies. It is also believed that other actors as retailers and producers of renewable
energy can exploit flexibility to reduce volume risks and imbalance costs. In this thesis
the buyers of flexibility include grid companies, retailers and producers of wind power.
The role of the TSO will also be described, however this actor is not included in the
analyses as the TSO holds many of the same interests as grid companies but at a central
level. Few of the existing market participants are utilizing the potential of the flexibility
today, but some grid companies and the TSO have bilateral agreements with large flexi-
ble consumers or industrial consumer to shut down the production or switch to di↵erent
energy sources, as oil or gas, if the load exceeds certain limits.
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Figure 2.7: Value of demand side flexibility. Contents adapted from [10].
When describing the need for flexibility it is important to distinguish between power
and energy. Power, given in watts, is defined as the instant flow of energy in the power
system and does also describe the electrical size of a component or a system. Energy,
measured in watt-hours, is the amount of energy produced or consumed during a certain
period of time, and the basis for the present electricity tari↵s for end-users[10]. For a
grid company it is exclusively flexibility in terms of power that is required on a local ba-
sis. For other market actors such as retailers, aggregators, balancing responsible parties,
TSOs and ESCOs that act on a more global level, the location of the consumers are of
less importance and not relevant to their activities as long as the system is stable.
Grid companies are responsible for the distribution network and transportation of elec-
tricity from suppliers to customers, and are also responsible for investments to connect
customers to the grid as well as to maintain and extend the grid capacity when neces-
sary. They operate on a local or regional basis, and act like natural monopolies ensuring
system reliability and stability at all time. The key dimension for grid planning and
operation is the peak load, whereas the volume of transported energy is of less impor-
tance. Today’s electricity grids are not dimensioned for the future changes in the energy
system like increased use of electrical vehicles, changing behavior of consumers and a
larger share of decentralized production [10]. High consumption peaks require expensive
reinforcements of what are often the less utilized parts of the network. For grid compa-
nies flexibility has the potential to optimize the operation and planning of distribution
networks. By decreasing demand in peak load hours the grid company can achieve lower
costs, enhance security of supply, increase system reliability and contribute to sustainable
energy development through facilitating the low carbon technology roll-out. Flexibility
can also be valuable in terms of postponed or replaced network reinforcements. As the
grid company faces local challenges, like congestion on a certain line or substation, only
end-users connected to that node can o↵er adequate flexibility to solve the problem.
Hence, only a limited number of grid users can supply flexibility[10]. It is expected that
grid companies have to play a more active role in the electrical system in the future, and
it will be necessary to increase the use of real time monitoring and advanced controlling
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equipment in the distribution grid as the electricity system changes. The authors believe
that flexibility and smart grid technology will be vital for the grid companies to cope
with the present and future challenges.
The TSO operates the national grid and is the overall system responsible party for
each country or control area. The TSO is also the market operator of the ancillary
service markets and hence responsible for maintaining balance between production and
consumption in the delivery hour. Like grid companies, the TSO faces challenges as
insu cient capacity and short lifetime in the transmission networks and in a worst case
scenario the risk of blackout is present. By exploiting flexibility the transmission network
security can be improved including network congestion, and voltage and frequency sta-
bility during outages. Additionally, the transmission capacity can be optimally utilized
and peak load in hours with high consumption can be reduced. This will increase the
reliability of supply and reduce costs associated with losses in the grid. Also large grid
investments can be reduced and postponed. As the market operator of the Balancing
Market, the TSO can activate flexibility for balancing purposes and ancillary services.
Most of these benefits are hard to value in financial terms, but an alternative valuation
can be derived from cost savings due to improvement in network security.
Retailers are companies that sell electricity to the end-users. There are many retail-
ers operating in a competitive market today. The retailers buy electricity either on the
Nordic power exchange or directly from production companies. When placing bids on
expected consumption in Elspot, the retailers might face imbalance costs if the real con-
sumption deviates from the submitted bid, in other words a volume risk is present. By
utilizing demand side flexibility these imbalance costs can be reduced. In many coun-
tries the electricity prices are very volatile and the retailers face price risks. In these
countries, flexibility can reduce both risks associated with price variations and volume.
By including flexibility in the submitted bids in Elspot and react to spot prices, the
elasticity of demand will increase and the average spot price of electricity will decrease.
The power producers generate and sell active power. Electricity production from in-
termittent energy sources as wind, solar and wave is not predictable and controllable to
the same extent as hydro power and energy from fossil fuels. Hence producers have to
base their production bids on forecasts. Hence, producers of renewable energy is more
exposed to imbalance costs than other producers due to unpredictable and frequently
deviations from production forecasts. Flexibility can be utilized to reduce these imbal-
ance costs. As hydro power counts for 99 percent of the electricity production in Norway,
imbalance costs are not a major problem and additionally the regulating prices are low.
However, in other countries this challenge is more prominent and it is expected to change
in the Nordic system as well with the increasing integration of production from wind
power. When considering the role of a power producer in this thesis, a producer of wind
power will be studied.
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2.3.3 Aggregator
A new and possibly essential role in the future electricity system is the aggregator. An
aggregator will be especially important for small suppliers, facilitating them to sell their
flexibility. Aggregators act as intermediaries between suppliers who provide the flexibil-
ity and the procurers of this flexibility. On one hand the aggregators handle flexibility
at the retail level by o↵ering innovative solutions that are interesting for the suppliers
and on the other they aggregate individual flexibility in su ciently large volumes for it
to be traded in a market or through contracts with buyers. In the present system very
few actors has taken on the role as aggregators, and there is no clear definition of which
services this role can o↵er. Examples of proposed services are controlling equipment and
software to manage loads, consulting services within energy e ciency and demand re-
sponse, management of power production, market entrance for other actors and a fully
allocation of energy where di↵erent loads is controlled directly by the aggregator. In
order for the aggregator to o↵er innovative services it might be necessary to specialize in
one specific service, for instance recharging electric vehicles or controlling heat pumps,
with their business models solely concentrating on the special properties of selected tech-
nologies [8]. If aggregators specialize in few services, a large number of aggregators can
exist in the market which will increase competition. This thesis will present some of the
business opportunities of flexibility addressed to aggregators.
Several possible actors can take the role as aggregators. Existing actors in the power
market can include an aggregator role in their businesses. The aggregator can also be
a third-party actor, for instance a consulting company or an IT service company. If
the aggregator does not have balance responsibility, a decrease or increase of electric-
ity consumption or production might lead to imbalances for the retailer of the relevant
supplier of flexibility. Thus, the balancing responsible party or the retailer would be
a↵ected by actions of other participants if their customers, i.e flexibility suppliers, are
involved. This externality must be addressed in some way, for instance by regulating
aggregators or through operating permits of flexibility [10]. Retailers have many incen-
tives to adapt this role. They are already balance responsible parties and are established
participants in existing markets. Retailers also operate in an competitive environment,
and new flexibility services may give them competitive advantages. Another advantage
is that retailers already manage customer portfolios. Hence, they have an advantage
compared to a new unknown actor o↵ering aggregator services. Through experience
from participation in the power markets, the retailers have achieved great knowledge
about price trends and revenue possibilities. Regardless of whom taking the aggregator
role, it needs to be ensured that the actors providing flexibility services act in a way that
do not hinder the security of supply or the safety and data privacy of the suppliers [10].
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2.4 Previous research
Most of the previous research related to future changes of the power market concentrate
on the technological aspects. In contrast there has been less focus on the interactions
between participants of demand side flexibility and how this resource can be extracted
as well as allocate the value e ciently in the value chain. In recent years more attention
has been paid to demand side flexibility. Large power actors and Governments have
started to realize the importance of this resource in the future energy system, and pro-
posed guidelines on how flexibility should be extracted and implemented in the system.
In [8] the TSO in Denmark and the Danish Energy Association propose a Smart Grid
concept which can be used to mobilize and activate flexible electricity consumption and
production from small customers and recommend how this concept should be imple-
mented. In May 2014 GEODE published a report [10] stating the vital role of demand
side flexibility for the future success of the Distribution System Operators across the Eu-
ropean Union. Some researchers and academics have studied various methods of trading
flexibility as well as to activate the resource from small suppliers. Most of these studies
can be categorized into two main groups. The first group focuses on contract design
between flexibility participants, while the other group has a market-based approach for
flexibility.
2.4.1 Contract design between flexibility agents
The major part of the study in this group design contracts between the procurers of
flexibility and the suppliers, with the main focus on how to engage suppliers as flexibil-
ity participants. Fahriog˜lu and Alvarado [2] employ a mechanism design approach for
designing incentive compatible contracts between a utility and its customers, where the
suppliers reveal their private information about costs. The strength of this approach is
that the asymmetry of information is addressed. Nevertheless, only a subset of possible
buyers and suppliers of flexibility is considered and potential intermediary parties are
not taken into account. [16] presents a contract design framework that enables demand
side resources to participate in ancillary services markets. They exploit mechanism de-
sign as well to design incentive compatible and individually rational contracts in the
presence of asymmetric information. The model analyzes the e↵ects various contract
design parameters have on the cost and amount of flexibility procured.
2.4.2 Market-based approach of flexibility
Some studies have shifted the focus towards trading in markets. The authors in [28] use
mechanism design to discover supplier categories and determine the adequate incentives
for each case and implement this in the unit commitment model of existing electricity
markets. The strength of this model is that it considers the relationship between flexi-
bility, the daily market price of electricity and the generation. However, this study only
include flexibility in existing markets and does not evaluate benefits of other market
solutions of flexibility. The authors in [14] and [15] propose a separate flexibility market
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where all buyers and suppliers can participate. Both papers treat flexibility as a public
good, an argues that this leads to e cient allocations in a socio-economic view. These
two papers will be described in more detail in Chapter 6.
2.4.3 Combined studies of flexibility
In this thesis studies from both groups will be combined in order to analyze if a larger
share of the potential for demand side flexibility can be utilized. Both value and costs
of flexibility will be quantified in order to find e cient solutions for trading flexibility.
Possible bilateral contracts between aggregators and buyers will be designed, a subject
that is not previously studied as far as the authors know. The thesis will not only
concentrate on grid companies as procurers of flexibility as most previous research, but
will consider several possible buyers and suppliers to extract the full value of flexibility.
Market-based and contractual solutions will be evaluated from both the perspective of
each single participants and the total social benefit of flexibility.
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Chapter 3
Cost and Benefit Functions of
Flexibility
Many studies have been carried out about benefits of flexibility, and most of them clearly
state that there indeed exists several benefits of exploiting this resource as described in
Chapter 2. However, distributing the benefits and costs fairly across all players is a
challenging task that need to be studied in more detail. In order to distribute the value
and cost of flexibility they first have to be quantified. This chapter defines functions for
quantifying costs and benefits of flexibility for suppliers and buyers, respectively, as well
as explain the shape of these functions. The parameters are estimated in order to be
used in illustrative examples in the next chapters. Additionally, a description is given
on how decision makers can use sophisticated empirical data to estimate these param-
eters more accurately. The chapter also explains how these functions can be modeled
as individual supply and demand curves and used in the market clearing of a flexibility
market. The market demand and supply curves are obtained by horizontally summing
all the individual demand and supply curves.
Several assumptions with stressing are made in this chapter. The benefit and cost
function are constructed on an hourly basis and only applies to hours with peak load
consumption and hence hours with high demand for flexibility. High demand results in
high flexibility prices which clearly a↵ect the illustrative studies. The numerical values
found in this chapter will be used for illustrative examples when studying contractual
and market-based business models of flexibility. The estimates are based on data from
various sources, and are scaled to adapt the cases and scenarios studied here. The es-
timates often rely on average values and represents average actors in Norway. These
approximations will clearly a↵ect the numerical results throughout the thesis.
3.1 Cost Function for Suppliers of Flexibility
Costs of supplying flexibility are hard to quantify as a large share of the costs vary with
individual preferences and are not always of the monetary art. This section will derive
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a cost function for flexibility and propose a guideline for how the parameters in the cost
function can be quantified.
3.1.1 Factors influencing the cost
The cost of supplying flexibility for end-users depends on several aspects. First of all,
the amount of load shifted or reduced will obviously a↵ect the cost and will vary de-
pending on which load the suppliers are required to shift or reduce. If the amount of
the curtailment is low the suppliers employ the cheapest loads for demand response. As
the amount increases, more expensive loads have to be reduced or shifted. [32] presents
an overview of di↵erent categories of load:
• Inflexible load: no flexibility, the load must be met at any time, e.g. alarms, lights,
base load. Inflexible load is consumption in which the end-users value too high to
reduce of shift.
• Reducible load: can be reduced, it is accepted that only parts of the load is met.
The reduced volume will not be met at a later time. A loss in comfort may occur,
and thus a corresponding cost, e.g. dimmed lights, ventilation systems.
• Flexible/portable load profile: can be moved in time, but the load profile is kept.
Can be moved both forward and backward in time, e.g. washing machines, indus-
trial processes.
• Flexible/portable volume: can be moved in time, and the load profile can be
changed as long as the total volume is covered. Can be moved both forward and
backward in time, e.g. batteries, heat loads and charging of electric vehicles.
Costs of various loads are illustrated by alternative prices in Figure 3.1. Electrical
water heaters and other heating systems with storage capacity can be considered as
relatively cheap flexibility, while base loads which are relatively inflexible have very high
alternative prices. By shifting load connected to washing machines, dryers or dishwashers
in households, or heating or cooling systems in o ce buildings, an alternative cost of
reduced comfort will apply. Flexibility with high alternative price can typically be time
shift of production processes for factories.
Second, the cost di↵er for each individual end-user since they have individual preferences
regarding load reduction or load shifting and hence depend on the supplier type. Finally,
the duration and timing of the curtailment will also influence the cost. The cost will
typically increase the longer the load has to be reduced. Further in this thesis, the cost
will only depend on the supplier type or the preference of the supplier and the volume of
flexibility supplied in order to simplify the cost function. The duration of the curtailment
is fixed to one hour.
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Figure 3.1: Cost of various electricity loads. Adapted from [13].
3.1.2 Cost function and supply curve
The cost of supplying flexibility can be described through the suppliers’ cost functions.
The cost functions will di↵er between the various supplier segments1 based on their
expected cost of providing a certain amount of flexibility, but the shape of the curve
remains the same for all suppliers. The cost Cs(✓s, xs) of curtailing xs kW to a supplier
of type ✓s is assumed given by
Cs(✓s, xs) = asx
2
s + bs(1  ✓s)xs 8s 2 S (3.1)
Here ✓s is a continuous variable describing the supplier type or the supplier preference
parameter. This parameter can be explained as the willingness for each supplier type
to curtail or shift load. For households, ✓s reflects private preferences of providing flexi-
bility and includes loss of comfort and privacy. For industry and commercial businesses
✓s can describe the inconveniences of shifting production schedules or reducing comfort
and work e↵ort. Higher values of ✓s imply higher willingness. as and bs are cost co-
e cients and are assumed equal for all supplier types in the same segment. The term
 bsxs✓s makes sure that various values of ✓s lead to di↵erent values of the marginal cost
for the supplier. Additionally, as ✓s increases the marginal cost decreases. Thus, the
cost function implies that the supplier with the lowest ✓s will have the highest marginal
cost and hence the lowest marginal benefit. For the sake of simplicity, the probability
distribution of ✓s, F (✓s), will be modeled as a uniform distribution where ✓s is a random
variable in the interval [0, 1]. This probability distribution is known to both the buyer
and the suppliers, but the value of ✓s is suppliers’ private information and is unknown
to the buyer.
The shape of the cost function is illustrated in Figure 3.2a. The cost function is strictly
convex and the marginal cost is positive and linearly increasing with the amount of flex-
ibility. Intuitively, this shape can be explained by the di↵erent costs of various loads.
When the supplier delivers only small amounts of flexibility the supplier can reduce or
shift the loads with lowest cost first. As more flexibility is reduced loads with higher cost
1As defined in Subsection 2.3.1 the suppliers are divided in households, industry and commercial
businesses.
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have to be curtailed, thus increasing the cost. The same reasoning apply for the marginal
cost, which will increase as more expensive loads are interrupted, i.e. the amount flexi-
bility xs is high. When the amount of flexibility supplied is so high that inflexible loads
have to be interrupted, the cost increases rapidly as seen in the figure. The cost will
increase until all loads have been curtailed. An exponential function can be a more
suitable description of the costs as the cost will increase more rapidly when converging
towards the maximum load available. For mathematical convenience the function stated
in (3.1) will be employed in further analyses.
x
C(x, ✓)
(a) Cost function of flexibility
x
c(x, ✓)
(b) Supply curve of flexibility
Figure 3.2: Shape of the total and marginal cost function of supplying flexibility.
If the flexibility is traded in a market, the individual supply curve can be derived from
the derivative of the cost function @Cs(x)@x for a given supplier type ✓ which corresponds
to the marginal cost of suppling flexibility. The supply curve indicates the relationship
between the price of the flexibility and the supplied volume. The supply curve for an
individual supplier s is
cs(xs) = 2asxs + bs(1  ✓s) 8s 2 S (3.2)
The total aggregated supply curve is found by horizontally summing the individual
supply curves for each supplier.
cagg =
SX
s=1
[2asxs + bs(1  ✓s)] (3.3)
3.1.3 Quantifying costs
Besides the technical ability, the engagement of a supplier to provide flexibility to the
system depends on his individual preferences regarding the costs and benefits associated
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with this supply. Quantifying costs of flexibility can be challenging both because of the
individual influence of providing flexibility and the fact that they are hard to measure.
Additionally, not all costs associated with supplying flexibility are of the monetary art.
Monetary costs could for example include lost production, higher costs for moving pro-
duction in time or start-up costs, while non-monetary costs include loss of comfort, loss
of privacy and other individual costs. Non-monetary costs arise especially for house-
holds. The total socio-economic cost of supplying flexibility can exceed the private cost
of every supplier due to the complexity of the electricity system. Flexibility can for
instance impose imbalance costs or reduced sale of electricity for the producers. From a
socio-economic perspective all costs should be considered. However, for simplicity only
the private costs will be taken into account in the analyses.
[18] presents the results of comprehensive surveys held to reveal the cost of energy
not supplied (CENS) for electricity consumers. A similar approach with surveys can be
employed to estimate the cost of providing flexibility among potential suppliers. Several
methods can be used in the surveys to estimate private costs including [18]:
• Direct Worth a method utilized to reveal the respondents direct costs as a conse-
quence of supplying a given amount of flexibility from di↵erent loads.
• Willingness-to-pay used to map the respondents willingness to pay for not reducing
or shifting di↵erent loads.
• Willingness-to-accept map the compensation the respondents require to supply
flexibility.
The survey should employ at least two of the methods in order to improve the estimate.
After the surveys are collected, the data should be processed. The cost parameters could
be normalized in order to compare the costs within a supplier segment. By so doing,
the average of the costs within a segment could represent the cost function for the whole
segment. Some common normalization factors are yearly electricity consumption and
maximal e↵ect. The advantage of surveys is that they can be customized to find specific
information. There are some drawbacks as well, including high costs and use of resources
and other common problems typically involved with surveys [18].
3.2 Numerical Estimates of the Cost
The numerical values of the cost coe cients are the basis for the illustrative studies
throughout this thesis. They are employed in both the maximization problem when
designing contracts and in the market clearing of flexibility markets. This section will
present the estimation methods and the assumptions for calculating cost coe cients for
various suppliers as well as the results. In addition to each segment’s cost function,
an aggregated cost function representing a large supplier and the market supply curve,
respectively, are presented as they will be employed in calculations later on.
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3.2.1 Estimates of costs for individual suppliers
The numerical estimates for the cost coe cients are based on the rates of CENS found
through surveys in [18]. Both Direct Worth and Willingness-to-pay were used in the sur-
veys, and the rates represent the average of the replies from the two methods. The rates
employed in the estimation of the cost coe cients are shown in Table 3.1 and are given
for a power interruption of one hour. Unlike power interruptions, supplying flexibility is
voluntarily and notified in advanced. Moreover, only a share of the supplier’s entire load
are curtailed. Consequently, the rate of CENS are scaled down in the calculation of the
cost coe cients. When small amounts of flexibility are provided the cost constitutes a
minor share of the CENS. As more flexibility is provided and expensive loads are reduced
the cost of providing flexibility converges towards the scaled CENS. The average con-
sumptions are calculated from data in [3]. Appendix A.2 illustrates various amounts of
flexibility curtailed and the corresponding estimated cost of providing this flexibility for
the three supplier segments. Based on these values regression analyses are performed to
find the cost coe cients for each segment and the results can be seen in Table 3.2. The
regressions are conducted with a fixed willingness parameter ✓ = 0, 5. For simplicity, it
is assumed that these numerical values of the coe cients holds for all values of ✓. In
reality they will deviate if ✓ changes and new regressions should be performed for each
✓. Complete calculations can be found in the attached Excel-file2.
Table 3.1: Input data for estimating costs for suppliers of flexibility.
Avg. consumption [kWh] CENS [NOK/kWh]
Industry 278 33,7
Commercial business 23,18 55,8
Household 2,71 8,6
As the results indicate, household suppliers have the lowest unit cost of providing flex-
ibility. However, a single household has relatively small amounts of flexibility due to
the low consumption compared to an industry or commercial business supplier. Thus, a
large number of household suppliers are required to obtain su cient volumes of flexibil-
ity, which may be costly. Additionally, household suppliers have to install automation
systems before they can participate whereas large commercial and industry suppliers
often have controlling systems installed already. For an aggregator or a buyer there
will be a trade-o↵ between lower unit costs and large number of suppliers as well as
the reliability of each supplier type. Note that the duration of the curtailment is fixed
to one hour, and hence does not take costs of curtailment in subsequently hours into
consideration. If the duration was two hours instead, the cost would probably increase
by more than the additional cost for one hour as implied here. This is not taken into
account in the thesis.
23 Cost Functions.xlsx
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3.2.2 The aggregated supply of flexibility
For further calculations a fictive large supplier is needed to match the demand of one
buyer. The large supplier can be seen as an intermediary party with aggregated flexi-
bility. In the illustrative study the aggregated portfolio consist of 15 industry suppliers,
150 commercial businesses and 2 000 households. In order to find the aggregated cost
coe cients for this supplier all the individual cost functions are horizontally summed
and the results are illustrated in Table 3.2.
When studying a flexibility market the aggregated market supply can be found by hor-
izontal summation of the supply curves of each individual supplier providing flexibility
to the market. It is assumed that the total market supply includes flexibility from 120
industry suppliers, 1 000 commercial businesses and 10 000 households. The share of
households are relatively low as it is assumed that these suppliers have less incentives to
participate in the near future. Estimates of the aggregated market supply are indicated
in Table 3.2. The size of this market corresponds to a small local market.
Table 3.2: Cost coe cients for various suppliers [NOK/(kWh/h)].
a b
Industry 0,04148 0,68950
Commercial business 0,82830 1,2000
Household 0,74320 0,09843
Large supplier 0,00030935 0,2243
Supply curve 0,000057 0,26996
3.3 Benefit Function for Buyers of Flexibility
The value of flexibility for the di↵erent actors in the power market can be described
through their benefit functions. The benefit functions will di↵er between the buyers
based on the expected benefit of having a certain volume of flexibility available in the
hours when its needed. It is assumed that the benefit Bj(xj) for buyer j of having xj
kW of flexibility available in a certain hour is given by
Bj(xj) =  ↵jx2j +  jxj 8j 2 J (3.4)
where ↵j and  j are the valuation coe cients for buyer j. These coe cients can be
determined by performing quantitative analyses of the buyers’ benefits from di↵erent
volumes of flexibility available. Notice that the benefit represents net benefit and does
not take into account the costs of buying the flexibility. Calculating benefits of flexibility
are not simple and entails estimating the financial value of flexibility actually delivered
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Figure 3.3: Shape of the total and marginal benefit function of procuring flexibility.
to the power system. Without an accurately estimation method, it will be challenging
to justify the improvements related to the exploitation of flexibility.
The shape of the benefit function is illustrated in Figure 3.3a. Notice that the function
is strictly concave. The marginal value of the flexibility is positive and decreasing with
the available volume of flexibility. The shape of the function can be justified based on
the assumption that the benefit will increase when the volume of available flexibility
increases until the maximum volume of flexibility required is reached. In other words,
the share of the reduced investment cost or reduced imbalance cost will increase as more
volume of flexibility is available. The decreasing marginal value can be explained by the
fact that a small amount of flexibility is su cient to postpone and reduce large costs,
while large volumes of flexibility are needed less frequently. This is shown in Figure 3.4,
in which illustrates that having a moderate amount of flexibility can cover the majority
of the needs. For a grid company it can be a matter of small margins to avoid congestion,
and for a producer of wind power or a retailer the deviations from scheduled production
and consumption are normally moderate.
When the flexibility is available through a market, the demand curve for flexibility can
be derived from the derivative of the benefit function, dBj(xj)dxj , given in equation (3.4).
Hence, the demand bj(xj) of buyer j for xj kW flexibility is
bj(xj) =  2↵jxj +  j 8j 2 J (3.5)
By horizontally summing the demand curves of all the buyers total demand for flexibility
is determined as
bagg =
JX
j=1
[ 2↵jxj +  j ] (3.6)
Notice that when looking at the demand for flexibility through a market perspective it
is assumed for simplicity that there are no restrictions on transfer capacity in the grid
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so that only one market for flexibility exists. Figure 3.3b shows the demand curve for
flexibility.
Load [kW]!
Time [h]!
Figure 3.4: Justification of the shape of the benefit function.
3.3.1 The value of flexibility for a grid company
[12] states that the largest benefit of flexibility for a grid company is reduced and post-
poned investments in lieu of capacity expansion. In addition, costs associated with
operational reliability CR and cost of energy not supplied CENS can be reduced. The
benefit BG(x) for a grid company by reducing a planned investment I and postponing
it in n(x) years when having x kW flexibility available in the hours it is needed is given
by
BG(x) = I   (1  ⇢(x))I   ⇢(x)I
(1 + i)n(x)
+ CENS + CR (3.7)
Here ⇢(x) is the percentage share of the investment that can be postponed, i is the
interest rate,  CENS is the reduced cost of energy not supplied and  CR is the reduced
cost associated with operational reliability. The first term I represents the planned in-
vestment, the second term (1   ⇢(x))I is the investment that cannot be reduced, while
the third term ⇢(x)I
(1+i)n(x)
is the present value of the share of the investment that can be
postponed and the two last terms represent the reduced costs of reliability and CENS.
The expression states that for each investment, ⇢ and n are dependent on the volume
of flexibility, x, available. If a grid company is planning an investment to increase the
capacity of the grid, this investment can be reduced, postponed or even eliminated by
having access to a certain volume of flexibility in hours with need, securing a capacity
within the given limits.
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To simplify the calculations in this thesis  CENS and  CR are neglected, but these
parameters should be included if the model is used for operational decisions. The de-
mand of flexibility for a grid company can be calculated based on expected congestion in
the grid related to a planned investment. A larger volume of flexibility available increases
the share of the investment postponed, and can be postponed for a longer time period.
At the same time a greater volume of flexibility will decrease the risk of postponing
investments. Through simulations of the load capacity required in transmission lines or
a transformer one can determine the required volume of flexibility needed to reduce a
certain investment cost. By studying empirical data and using forecasting models the
relation between the share of investment reduced, the number of years the investment
can be postponed and the volume of flexibility can be found.
3.3.2 The value of flexibility for a producer of wind power
For a wind power producer, or other producers of energy from intermittent sources,
flexibility can compensate for costs associated with irregular production and deviations
from scheduled production. When the actual power production deviates from scheduled
production3, the producer faces imbalance costs. Table 3.3 presents the di↵erent costs
occurring for a wind power producer based on the direction of the regulating volume
and the system balance. This is known as the two-price model.
Table 3.3: Two-price model for regulating costs in the Balancing Market.
Actors balance System balance
Surplus  h = 1 Shortage  h = 1
xAh > x
S
h P
SPOT
h   PDOWNh 0
xAh < x
S
h 0 P
UP
h   PSPOTh
When actual production xAh deviates from scheduled production x
S
h the producer of
wind power will face imbalance costs based on the volume of deviation and the system
balance. If actual production is higher than scheduled production, the producer receives
spot price when the system is in shortage or downward regulating price if the system
is in surplus. Consequently, in the first case the price for the excess production equals
the spot price, and no loss incurs. In the latter, the producer only receives downward
regulating price for the excess production, and hence faces a lost revenue. When actual
production is lower than scheduled production, the producer pays spot price when the
system is in surplus or upward regulating price when the system is in shortage. Here
the producer has to pay spot price or upward regulating price to cover the production
3Here it is assumed that scheduled production equals the volume bid into Elspot
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deviations and can resell it for spot price, thus facing a loss in the latter situation. In
hours with system balance, the upward and downward regulating prices are equal to the
spot price, and the power producer will not incur imbalance costs, or lost revenue. The
cost or lost revenue given in NOK/MWh caused by production imbalance PBALh in hour
h is given by
PBALh =
(
(PSPOTh   PDOWNh ) h if xSh < xAh
(PUPh   PSPOTh ) h if xSh > xAh
8h 2 H (3.8)
where PSPOTh , P
DOWN
h and P
UP
h is the spot price, the downward regulating price and
the upward regulating price in hour h respectively. The binary variables  h and  h are
equal to one if the system is in surplus or shortage respectively. To ensure that the
system is in either shortage, surplus or balance, the following restriction is added
 h +  h  1  h,  h 2 {0, 1} 8h 2 H (3.9)
If both  h and  h are equal to zero the system is in balance and no imbalance cost
occurs. In the case of deviations from scheduled production, the volume of regulating
quantity needed in each hour xRh is defined as
xRh =
8><>:
xAh   xSh if xSh < xAh
xSh   xAh if xSh > xAh
0 otherwise
8h 2 H (3.10)
This expression declares the regulating quantity which is always positive or equal to zero
when there no deviation occurs. Finally, the hourly benefit BP (xFh ) of reduced imbalance
costs for a producer of renewable energy when having xFh MW flexibility available in the
specified hour is
BP (x
F
h ) =
(
PBALh x
R
h if x
R
h  xFh
PBALh x
F
h if x
R
h > x
F
h
8h 2 H (3.11)
If the available volume of flexibility is equal to or higher than the regulating volume
required, the benefit is simply calculated as the regulating volume multiplied with the
cost or lost revenue from imbalance. On the other hand, if the available volume of flex-
ibility is less than the needed regulating volume, the benefit is given by the profit from
the available volume of flexibility. Notice that the benefit is given on an hourly basis
and that it includes both costs and lost revenues.
By having a certain amount of flexibility available at all time the yearly imbalance
costs are assumed to be reduced by a given percentage share. The greater volume of
flexibility available, the greater reduction of the imbalance costs can be achieved. Hence,
the benefit function is characterized by the shape in Figure 3.3a. The maximum volume
of flexibility required is estimated to be a percentage share of total installed capacity,
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given by [11]. It is di cult to predict imbalance costs, but by studying historical data,
wind forecasts and obtaining knowledge about expected deviations from scheduled pro-
duction it is possible to calculate an estimate of the benefit of flexibility. However, it
should be emphasized that if the regulating prices are lower than the price of flexibility
the producers will not benefit from procuring flexibility. Another issue for producers
is the fact that average electricity prices are expected to decrease when introducing
flexibility to the system, hence reducing the overall income.
3.3.3 The value of flexibility for a retailer
Like the wind power producer, a retailer faces imbalance costs due to volume risk in the
daily market but the volume and frequency of the deviations from the original consump-
tion or production schedule di↵ers, and thus the size of the imbalance costs. Flexible
load can be exploited to reduce the imbalance cost associated with the deviation in
scheduled and actual consumption. The imbalance costs occurring for di↵erent direc-
tions of regulating volume and system balance, the one-price model, are presented in
Table 3.4. The retailer can also use flexibility to avoid buying electricity in expensive
peak load hours by bidding elastic demand curves.
Table 3.4: One-price model for regulating costs in the Balancing Market.
Actors balance System balance
Surplus  h = 1 Shortage  h = 1
xAh > x
S
h P
DOWN
h   PSPOTh PUPh   PSPOTh
xAh < x
S
h P
SPOT
h   PDOWNh PSPOTh   PUPh
When the actual consumption xAh exceeds scheduled consumption x
S
h , the retailer pays
downward regulating price when the system is in surplus and upward regulating price
when the system is in shortage. In the first case the retailer faces a revenue from buying
the extra electricity at a lower price. In the latter the retailer su↵ers a loss due to pay-
ing a higher price for the extra consumption than if the bid was accurate. If the actual
consumption is lower than the scheduled consumption the retailer receives upward reg-
ulating price when the system is in shortage and downward regulating price when the
system is in surplus. Here the retailer paid spot price for the electricity and can resell
the unused electricity facing a revenue or a loss. The cost or possible lost revenue PBALh
in NOK/MWh associated with the regulating volume is given by
PBALh =
(
(PDOWNh   PSPOTh ) h + (PUPh   PSPOTh ) h if xSh < xAh
(PSPOTh   PDOWNh ) h + (PSPOTh   PUPh ) h if xSh > xAh
8h 2 H
(3.12)
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The variables are presented in the previous subsection. Notice that when actual con-
sumption is less than scheduled consumption and the system is in shortage, the retailer
face a revenue equal to (PUPh   PSPOTh ) per MWh, likewise when actual consumption
is higher than scheduled consumption and the system is in surplus the retailer faces
a revenue equal to (PSPOTh   PDOWNh ), and hence these situations are described as a
negative costs. Equation (3.9) ensures that the system is in either surplus, shortage or
balance, and the regulating quantity is given by (3.10).
The hourly benefit for the retailer BR(xFh ) of having a volume of x
F
h MW of flexibil-
ity available is calculated from
BR(x
F
h ) =
(
PBALh x
R
h if x
R
h  xFh
PBALh x
F
h if x
R
h > x
F
h
8h 2 H (3.13)
This can be interpreted in the same way as for the wind power producer. Demand
forecasts for retailers are based on seasonally factors, weather and consumption patterns.
With the increased use of electrical vehicles it is likely that future consumption will be
more unpredictable, and higher imbalance costs will occur.
3.4 Numerical Estimates of the Benefit of Flexibility
The numerical calculations of the benefit for buyers of flexibility are based on hourly
gain obtained by having a given volume of flexibility available in the certain hour. Large
amounts of data have to be analyzed by using an appropriate estimation method to
quantify the benefits. In some cases the buyer do not know the benefit obtained by
exploiting flexibility and the calculations will have to be based on expected values of
costs, gains and number of days flexibility is required. The approach for computing the
valuation coe cients for each buyer consists of three steps:
1. Formulate an expression for the benefit of the buyer based on expected reduced
costs by having a certain volume of flexibility available in the given hour
2. Calculate the benefit for di↵erent volumes of available flexibility
3. Find the valuation coe cients by fitting an analytical function, B(x), to the pre-
vious obtained benefit values
3.4.1 Estimates of benefits for individual buyers
To estimate the valuation coe cients for a grid company data about yearly investments
costs is based on numbers from [34]. The estimates are made for an average grid com-
pany in Norway. Only the share of investment connected to capacity expansion in the
grid is considered. It is assumed that overload occurs in 5 percent of the days each
year and that the duration of the problem is 5 hours, leading to an estimated hourly
investment cost of 285 000 NOK. Notice that this cost only applies to the hours where
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flexibility is needed. The calculated benefit is sensitive to the input parameter. For
instance, by assuming that flexibility is needed more frequently the hourly benefit will
decrease significantly. The input data is presented in Table 3.5. The regression analysis
to determine the valuation coe cients for a grid company is based on the numbers in
Appendix A.2, whereas the value gain is calculated from (3.7). For simplicity  CENS
and  CR are neglected.
Table 3.5: Input data for estimating valuation coe cients for the grid company.
Total yearly investment cost [NOK] 26 000 000
Hourly investment cost [NOK] 284 931
Interest rate 5 %
No. of days with overload in a year 5 %
No. of hours with overload each day 5
No. of hours with overload 91
The estimation of valuation coe cients for a wind power producer examines a producer
with a total installed capacity of 150 MW and expected maximum production devia-
tions of 10 % of total installed capacity [11]. The accuracy of the production schedule
is based on bids placed in Elspot 24 hours before actual production. It is assumed that
the producer do not participate in Elbas to correct the production schedule closer to the
hour of operation. The input data for the calculations is presented in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Input data for estimating valuation coe cients for the wind power producer.
Present Future
Total installed capacity [MW] 150 150
Day-ahead deviation 10 % 10 %
Yearly imbalance cost [NOK] 4 000 000 8 000 000
No. of hours with deviation in a year 35 % 35 %
Average hourly imbalance cost [NOK] 1 380 2 609
The yearly imbalance cost is scaled down from the estimated calculations in [4]4. By
assuming that the producer of wind power faces production deviations in 35 % of the
hours in a year, an average hourly imbalance cost is calculated for these hours. The
benefit curve di↵ers from one day to another due to varying imbalance costs, and hence
an average day is studied with a maximum deviation of 7,5 % of installed capacity. The
4An error in the calculations was detected in the original project work, but this error was corrected
before the value of imbalance costs was obtained.
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share of the costs to be reduced depends on the available volume of flexibility in the
given hour. The calculations include both a present and a future scenario with doubled
regulating costs for the producer and the retailer. It is assumed that only the regulating
prices will change, and not the frequency of the deviations. The valuation coe cients
derived from the regression analysis for both scenarios are presented in Table 3.8.
In reality a wind power producer is able to perform a significantly more accurate cal-
culation of the imbalance costs. The value gain associated with the regulating volumes
should be studied in more detail to justify the benefit of flexibility in this case. Especially
the frequency of large regulating volumes occurring should be compared to the frequency
of impacts of lower regulating volumes. By aggregating the imbalance costs for di↵erent
seasons, prices, system balances and volumes of deviation, a whole year can be simulated.
The calculations for a retailer is similar to the wind power producer but rely on dif-
ferent assumptions and values. The yearly imbalance costs used as the basis of the
calculations are obtained from [4], and serve as a pessimistic bound5. As the regulating
prices often are equal to the spot price, it is assumed that imbalance costs only occur in
25 % of the hours during a year, independent of the number of hours with consumption
deviation. A retailer with a total load of 250 MW6 has an average deviation of 1,8 %
of total load [4]. When estimating the benefit of flexibility a deviation of 0,9 percent of
total load in the given hour is assumed. This assumption clearly a↵ects the results, but
is assumed to be a reasonable assumption weighing up for the high estimate of yearly
imbalance costs. The input data is given in Table 3.7. The hourly imbalance costs in
the hours with consumption deviations are calculated, and the share to be reduced as
well as the corresponding benefit are presented in Appendix A.2.
Table 3.7: Input data for estimating valuation coe cients for the retailer.
Present Future
Total load [MW] 250 250
Day-ahead deviation 1,8 % 1,8 %
Yearly imbalance cost [NOK] 5 000 000 10 000 000
No. of hours with deviation in a year 25 % 25 %
Average hourly imbalance cost [NOK] 2 283 4 566
As the Table 3.8 clearly indicates, the grid company has significantly higher hourly ben-
efit than the retailer and wind power producer. The size of the gaps between the benefits
are highly dependent on the approximations and assumptions made. However, research
imply that grid companies have large potentials of flexibility and it is realistic that the
5High imbalance costs.
6Corresponding to he size of Trondheim Kraft
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grid company for this reason has higher benefit than the other buyers. Since the benefits
for retailers and producers of intermittent energy sources rely on the electricity prices
which is low today, they have larger potential in the future with possibly larger varia-
tions in prices. This is illustrated with larger valuation coe cients for both actors in
the future scenario. The entire calculations and assumptions are found in the attached
Excel-file7.
3.4.2 The aggregated demand of flexibility
In order to investigate the possibility of flexibility to be traded in a separate flexibility
market, the aggregated demand function needs to be defined. Here the aggregated
market demand consists of two grid companies, four retailers and four producers of wind
power. The demand function is given in (3.5) and the total market demand is derived by
horizontal summation of the individual demand curves. Both demand in a present and
a future scenario is calculated to illustrate how the market demand changes when the
benefit of di↵erent buyers increases. The valuation coe cients are presented in Table
3.8, and as can be seen from the numerical results, the grid companies are dominating
the demand for flexibility, especially in the present scenario due to substantially higher
benefit than the other actors. It should be emphasized that these numerical results does
not reflect the real market demand, but serves as a good example of how actors with
di↵erent benefits a↵ect the market.
Table 3.8: Valuation coe cients for the buyers given [NOK/(kWh/h)].
Present scenario Future scenario
↵   ↵  
Grid company 0,0003774 13,44
Wind power producer 0,00004 0,4787 0,00007541 0,9049
Retailer 0,0006103 2,371 0,001221 4,742
Aggregated demand curve 0,0001887 13,44 0,0001165 10,12
73 Benefit Functions.xlsx
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Chapter 4
Contract Design
There are various ways to trade flexibility in order to allocate the value of flexibility
among the participants. This chapter describes a contractual approach, in which flex-
ibility is traded bilaterally between a supplier and a buyer to solve a certain problem.
The costs and benefits as well as the risks are allocated between the actors through a
chosen contract type in a simplified value chain consisting of only one buyer of flexibil-
ity and one large supplier as seen in Figure 4.1. The large supplier is aggregated from
several small suppliers as described in Subsection 3.2.2. In reality, buyers of flexibility
will engage in contracts with multiple suppliers of flexibility or an aggregator in order
to obtain su cient flexibility to solve their problems. The objective of the chapter is to
determine the optimal contracts in various information scenarios both theoretically and
applied to the energy market.
SUPPLIER!
Household, Industry,!
Commercial Business!
Flexibility contract!
Flexibility!
Financial!
compensation!
BUYER!
Grid Companies,!
Retailers, Producers!
of Renewable Energy!
Figure 4.1: Value chain of flexibility consisting of a buyer and a large supplier.
When designing a contract, it is important to consider the lead time. Short lead time
might encourage actors to strategically withhold in order to raise the price and at the
same time there is no long-term financial obligations for the contractors. On the other
hand, long-term agreements give more financial security which will be essential to some
of the actors. For instance, a grid company may benefit from a long-term contract for
delivery of flexibility if the flexibility is used to postpone investments. Additionally, the
contract design will di↵er in the situation of a one-time o↵er versus a repetitive contrac-
tual relationship. This thesis focuses on contracts in general, and the lead time of the
contracts and the number of contracts o↵ered are not taken into consideration. In all
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contractual relationships there is a risk that the parties violate the contract terms, and
hence a penalty charge should be activated if the supplier fails to deliver the contracted
volume of flexibility. For simplicity the penalty is disregarded in this thesis, but should
indeed be included in other contexts.
Principal-agent theory will be employed when designing contracts, in which a principal,
here the buyer of flexibility, designs and o↵ers a contract that an agent, the supplier,
can accept or reject. When designing contracts, the buyer has to consider the type of
contract he can o↵er and his available information about the supplier’s cost structure of
providing flexibility. A complicating factor which often leads to sub-optimal outcomes is
lack of information for the buyer in the contractual relationships. Suppliers of flexibility
can have private information about the their marginal cost of supplying flexibility. Buy-
ers, on the other hand, may have private information about both their marginal costs
and benefits of procuring flexibility. Both linear and nonlinear contracts are designed
and analyzed in order to reach an e cient outcome under various conditions. Due to the
di↵erent properties of various contract types and the di↵erent preferences among actors,
multiple contracts will be studied including a profit-sharing contract, a one-part linear
contract, a two-part linear contract and a nonlinear incentive compatible contract. The
first section analyzes the simplest scenario with complete information. Further, uncer-
tainty about the value of flexibility will be introduced, as well as asymmetric information
about the supplier’s willingness to provide flexibility.
The contract design in this chapter relies on several assumptions that is worth stressing.
First, it is assumed that both the buyer and the supplier adopt an optimizing behav-
ior and maximize their individual utility. Given the contract o↵ered by the buyer, the
supplier maximizes his own utility and chooses volume of flexibility accordingly. Sec-
ond, unless otherwise stated, the buyer moves first as a Stackelberg leader. This means
that the buyer will design and o↵er a contract to the supplier who accepts or rejects
the contract. The illustrative calculations in the chapter are based on an hourly time
resolution where flexibility is needed in the given peak load hour, and it is assumed
that the supplier can provide su cient flexibility to cover this demand. It is important
to emphasize that the numerical results are highly dependent on the cost and benefit
coe cients calculated in Chapter 3, and that the intention of the calculations is to illus-
trate the functionalities of the contracts in di↵erent scenarios. Only selected derivations
and results will be presented in this chapter, whereas the remaining can be found in
Appendix A.3. Detailed numerical calculations are given in attached Excel-files1. The
procedure for deriving the optimal contracts is based on the work in [7].
4.1 Contracting under Complete Information
In this section it is assumed that the buyer of flexibility has complete information about
the supplier’s cost of providing flexibility. Hence, the buyer knows the true value of the
14 Contract Design.xlsx
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cost coe cients a and b as well as the willingness parameter ✓. The benefit of flexibility
B(x) is also known to both parties. Under complete information, the buyer can use his
knowledge about the supplier’s cost structure to find the actual volume of flexibility sup-
plied when o↵ering di↵erent types of contracts, and hence derive an optimal contract. In
reality complete information rarely occurs in contractual relationships but the analytical
and numerical results in this section can serve as a benchmark for the contracts in the
other information scenarios to be investigated.
The contracts to be studied under the scenario with complete information are a profit-
sharing contract denoted C1 in the subscripts, a one-part linear contract denoted C2,
and a two-part linear contract denoted C3. The procedure for deriving the optimal con-
tract parameters is the same in all information scenarios, and thus the calculations are
explained thoroughly in this section and in the following sections only the optimization
problems and the derived expressions are presented.
4.1.1 Profit-sharing contract
In a profit-sharing contract the buyer of flexibility o↵ers the supplier a percentage share
(1  ⇢) of the joint value chain profit given by
⇡V C,C1 =  ↵x2 +  x  ax2   b(1  ✓)x (4.1)
where a, b, ✓, ↵ and   are the cost and benefit coe cients of the parties. The percentage
shared with the supplier depends on their bargaining power. The maximization problem
of the buyer is given by
max⇡B,C1(x) = ⇡V C,C1⇢ (4.2)
whereas the maximization problem of the supplier can be written
max
x
⇡S,C1(x) = ⇡V C,C1(1  ⇢) (4.3)
The optimal amount of flexibility x given in kW chosen by the supplier can be found by
the derivative of (4.3) with respect to x and results in
x*V C =
    b(1  ✓)
2(a+ ↵)
(4.4)
As can be seen from (4.4) the optimal volume of flexibility is independent of ⇢. Thus,
the supplier will always choose the volume that both maximizes its own profit and the
joint value chain profit. This equation also illustrates that if a buyer has large benefit
of flexibility, i.e. large   and small ↵, the optimal volume of flexibility traded is high.
Likewise this applies when the supplier have low costs, i.e. low a and b and high ✓. In
contrast the optimal volume of flexibility decreases with decreasing benefit or increasing
costs. It is clear that under complete information a profit-sharing contract will always
maximize the profit of both parties. The value chain profit as a function of the cost and
benefits parameters is given by substituting the optimal volume of flexibility in (4.4)
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into (4.1) and equals
⇡V C,C1 =
(b(1  ✓)   )2
4(a+ ↵)
(4.5)
Since the buyer is designing and o↵ering the contract it is natural to assume that he has
the greatest bargaining power and that he will claim the largest share of the joint profits
so ⇢   (1   ⇢) and thus ⇡B,C1   ⇡S,C1. In reality it is unlikely that a small supplier
of flexibility, such as a single household, will have bargaining power in a contractual
relationship with the buyer e.g. a grid company, and hence he will obtain only a marginal
profit. In contrast a large supplier or an aggregated portfolio of suppliers will have
substantial higher bargaining power and might take advantage of this in a profit-sharing
contract by claiming a significantly larger share of the joint profits.
4.1.2 One-part linear contract
In a one-part linear contract the buyer o↵ers a wholesale price w per kW flexibility
to the supplier. The buyer determines an optimal contract by solving the following
maximization problem
max
w
⇡B,C2(w) =  ↵x2 +  x  wx (4.6)
and finds the optimal wholesale price by investigating the supplier’s maximization prob-
lem
max
x
⇡S,C2(x) = wx  ax2   b(1  ✓)x (4.7)
The optimal volume of flexibility x* supplied for any wholesale price w is determined by
the derivative of the supplier’s profit with respect to x
@⇡S,C2
@x
= w   2ax  b(1  ✓) = 0 (4.8)
and solving (4.8) for x yields
xC2 =
1
2a
(w   b(1  ✓)) (4.9)
The buyer now determines the wholesale price w that maximizes his profit given the op-
timal volume, and by substituting (4.9) into (4.6) the buyer solves the following problem
max
w
⇡B,C2(w) =  ↵
✓
w   b(1  ✓)
2a
◆2
+  
✓
w   b(1  ✓)
2a
◆
 w
✓
w   b(1  ✓)
2a
◆
(4.10)
The optimal wholesale price is then determined by the derivative of (4.10) with respect
to w
@⇡B,C2
@w
=   ↵
2a2
(w   b(1  ✓)) +  
2a
  1
2a
(2w   b(1  ✓)) = 0 (4.11)
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Solving for w the buyer find the optimal wholesale price w*C2 that should be o↵ered to
the supplier
w*C2 =
a  + b(1  ✓)(↵+ a)
↵+ 2a
(4.12)
Evaluating (4.12) it is obvious that buyers with large benefit of flexibility are able to
o↵er a substantial higher wholesale price to the supplier than buyers with smaller ben-
efit. Thus, suppliers of flexibility prefer to contract with buyers having high benefit,
as grid companies, while other buyers, as retailers and wind power producers, might
risk to design unattractive contracts. Additionally, suppliers with high costs require a
high wholesale price compared to suppliers with low costs. Obviously, as for all contract
types, the value chain profit will be low or even negative, if a buyer with low benefit,
as a wind power producer, contract with a supplier having high cost, i.e. commercial
businesses, and hence such contractual relationship will not be formed. In the case of a
one-part linear contract the profit of the buyer is given by
⇡B,C2 =
(    b(1  ✓))2
4(↵+ 2a)
(4.13)
while the supplier’s profit is determined by
⇡S,C2 =
a(    b(1  ✓))2
4(↵+ 2a)2
(4.14)
By comparing (4.13) with (4.14) it is clear that the buyer’s profit is higher than the
supplier’s profit as ⇡S,C2 = (
a
↵+2a)⇡B,C2 and
a
↵+2a < 1 for all positive values of a and ↵.
This result is not surprising since the party with the initiative to propose the contract
terms, here the buyer captures the largest proportion of the value chain profit. Suppliers
with low bargaining power, such as households, might obtain a higher profit from a one-
part linear contract than a profit-sharing or two-part linear contract due to the degree of
bargaining power. The value chain profit in the one-part linear contract is less than the
optimal value chain profit given in (4.5). This results from the fact that the buyer chooses
a lower wholesale price leading to a smaller amount of flexibility traded, x*C2 < x
*
V C .
4.1.3 Two-part linear contract
In a two-part linear contract the buyer o↵ers a constant unit wholesale price w per kW
flexibility x and a fixed lump sum payment L to the supplier2. The buyer determines
the contract (w, L) that optimizes his profits by solving the following problem
max
(w,L)
⇡B,C3(w,L) =  ↵x2 +  x  wx  L (4.15)
2In the contracts presented the lump sum payment L is defined to be paid by the buyer, but in reality
the opposite will occur since the buyer is designing the contracts and will use the lump sum to extract
the profit from the supplier. Hence, the value of L proves to be negative in most of the calculations.
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s.t. ⇡S,C3   ⇡ S (4.16)
where ⇡ S is the supplier’s reservation profit and ⇡S,C3 is given by
max
x
⇡S,C3(x) = wx  ax2   b(1  ✓)x+ L (4.17)
As the buyer has complete information about the supplier’s cost structure he can set
the inequality (4.16) to be binding. Additionally, the buyer’s profit is determined by
⇡B,C3 = ⇡V C,C1   ⇡ S where ⇡V C,C1 denotes the joint value chain profit given in (4.5).
Thus, the maximization problem in (4.15) is equivalent to maximizing joint profits. Since
L is independent of x it will not a↵ect the supplier’s decision of volume of flexibility so
when the buyer o↵ers a two-part linear contract, it is optimal for the supplier to choose
the volume of flexibility that optimizes the value chain profit. The optimal lump sum L
is determined by substituting (4.17) and (4.4) into (4.16), and solving for L gives
L*C3 = ⇡
 
S   w
✓
    b(1  ✓)
2(a+ ↵)
◆
+ a
✓
    b(1  ✓)
2(a+ ↵)
◆2
+ b(1  ✓)
✓
    b(1  ✓)
2(a+ ↵)
◆
= ⇡ S  
a(    b(1  ✓))2
4(↵+ a)2
(4.18)
The lump sum is negative by definition due to (4.16) and (4.18), and hence the absolute
value of L increases with increasing benefit, which means that the buyer will obtain
higher profits. The optimal wholesale price w*C3 equals the supplier’s marginal cost for
the optimal volume of flexibility in (4.4) and hence
w*C3 = 2ax+ b(1  ✓) =
a(    b(1  ✓))
a+ ↵
+ b(1  ✓) (4.19)
As illustrated above, when the buyer has complete information about the supplier’s cost
structure it is optimal to set the wholesale price equal to the supplier’s marginal cost
and use the lump sum payment to extract all profits from the supplier in excess of his
reservation profit ⇡ S . Thus, the supplier pays a fee to the buyer to enter the contract
relationship. The lump sum payment required by the buyer might decrease the incentive
for small suppliers of flexibility to engage in a flexibility contract as there is already lack
of incentives to induce such suppliers in providing flexibility to the electricity system.
In contrast, large suppliers already aware of the value of flexibility might be willing to
pay the lump sum to supply flexibility to a large buyer, and hence gain profits by doing
so. The buyer profit equals
⇡B,C3 =
(b(1  ✓)   )2
4(↵+ a)
  ⇡ S (4.20)
and the supplier’s profit is given by
⇡S,C3 = ⇡
 
S (4.21)
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Clearly the supplier profit is dependent on the balance of negotiation in the contractual
relationship like in the profit-sharing contract. If the supplier has low bargaining power,
he might accept a lower reservation profit than if he had greater bargaining power. It can
easily be seen that the two-part linear contract optimizes the value chain profit as the
sum of the profits in (4.20) and (4.21) equals the optimal value chain profit ⇡V C,C1 given
in (4.5). Based on these contractual analyses a two-part linear contract is well suited
for large buyers contracting with a large supplier of flexibility. When o↵ering contracts
to smaller suppliers, as households, the buyer should consider a profit-sharing contract
or a one-part linear contract instead. In reality the flexibility required by the di↵erent
buyers will most likely not coincide in the same hours, and hence the supplier will have
the opportunity to deliver flexibility to various buyers through multiple contracts.
4.1.4 Illustrative study of complete information
The derived expressions for x, w, L and actors’ profits are employed to provide numerical
examples of the various contracts. Table 4.1 shows the results from the calculations in
di↵erent contract types between the large supplier and a grid company. Comparing the
hourly profits in the each contract, it can be seen that both the profit-sharing contract
and the two-part linear contract maximize the value chain profit and yield the highest
profit for the buyer if the percentage shared and the reservation profit of the supplier
equal the supplier profit in the one-part linear contract. These results correspond well
with the analytical analysis. In the calculations, the supplier’s reservation profit is set
equal to the supplier profit in a one-part linear contract and the supplier’s percentage
of the joint profit is 30 %.
Table 4.1: Bilateral contracts between a grid company and a large supplier under
complete information.
Profit-sharing One-part linear Two-part linear
Optimal volume [kW] 9 704 6 690 9 704
Supplier profit [NOK] 19 399 13 845 13 845
Buyer profit [NOK] 45 265 44 582 50 819
Value chain profit [NOK] 64 664 58 427 64 664
As stated in the previous subsections, both the optimal volume of flexibility traded and
the wholesale price increases with increasing benefit in all contract types. The supplier
will prefer to contract with a grid company as the calculations estimate this benefit to be
significantly higher than the benefit of the other buyers. The yearly profits of the buyers
shown in Table 4.2 are calculated by multiplying the hourly profit with the expected
number of hours that flexibility is needed. Contracts o↵ered by the retailer and the
wind power producer might be rejected by the supplier due to the higher alternative
profit by contracting with a grid company.
43
CHAPTER 4. CONTRACT DESIGN
Table 4.2: Yearly value chain profits for various buyers of flexibility under complete
information.
Grid company Wind power producer Retailer
Hours with
activated flexibility
91 3 066 2 190
Value chain profit 5 884 410 294 866 3 034 951
The retailer and the producer of wind power achieve low hourly profits regardless of the
contract type due to their low estimated benefit caused by relatively low regulating prices
in the present Balancing Market. With an increased share of renewable production from
intermittent sources in the future power system, the regulating prices are expected to
increase. This is illustrated in a future scenario where it is assumed that the imbalance
costs are doubled. Using the future benefit in the contract calculations, the hourly value
chain profits are clearly higher than in the present scenario as can be seen in Table
4.3. Hence, it is believed that it is possible to gain higher profits by utilizing flexibility
for these actors in the future. As complete information rarely occurs in contractual
relationships, the next sections will introduce more realistic scenarios with uncertainty
and asymmetric information present.
Table 4.3: Hourly profits in present and future scenarios under complete information.
Present Future
Retailer profit [NOK] 1 386 3 502
Producer profit [NOK] 96 408
4.2 Contracting under Uncertainty
In reality it is reasonable to assume that the benefit of flexibility is uncertain for some
actors, especially in the case of a retailer or wind power producer facing imbalance costs
that might be di cult to predict. This degree of uncertainty can be removed if the
contract is designed to o↵er flexibility when needed rather than contracting on flexi-
bility in predefined hours. In contrast it is less reasonable to argue that the benefit
of a grid company is uncertain since planned investment costs are known. However,
it can be challenging to anticipate the need for flexibility based on increasing energy
demand and higher peak loads in the future. In this section uncertainty is introduced
to the contractual relationship between the buyer and supplier of flexibility. It is now
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x
B(x)
B(↵)
B(↵)
B(↵¯)
(a) Uncertain ↵
x
B(x)
B( ¯)
B( )
B( )
(b) Uncertain  
Figure 4.2: Benefit functions for various valuation coe cients.
assumed that the buyer’s benefit of flexibility B(x) is uncertain for both parties when
the contract terms are negotiated. In other words, the parameters ↵ and   are un-
known but is assumed to be uniformed distributed within a given interval. It is stated
that        ¯ and ↵  ↵  ↵¯. Following from the shape of the benefit curve it is
known that B( )  B( )  B( ¯) and B(↵¯)  B(↵)  B(↵) as illustrated in Figure 4.2.
In the event of uncertainty the buyer risks obtaining a profit deviating from the optimal
profit in complete information, due to sub-optimal contract design. Under uncertainty
the buyer specifies the contract terms based on expected values of the benefit, and the
actual benefit is revealed after the contract is concluded. When the actual benefit of
flexibility is identified, it is assumed that both parties have complete information about
the benefit which is a reasonable consideration as imbalance costs can be calculated from
the regulating prices in retrospect. The sequence of information is illustrated in Figure
4.3.
1. Contract designed and offered!
Buyer designs contract based!
on expected benefit of flexibility"
and offers contract to supplier"
2. Volume is selected !
Supplier accepts (or rejects) the contract,!
and chooses volume of flexibility based!
on his maximization problem"
3. Supplier profit"
Supplier obtains a profit based!
on the specified payment and !
selected volume"
4. Actual buyer profit!
The actual benefit of flexibility"
is known to all actors and buyer !
receives his profit"
Uncertain benefit 
Benefit known 
Figure 4.3: Information timeline in the contractual relationship under uncertainty.
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To determine how di↵erent contract types handle uncertainty, the same contracts as in
the case with complete information are studied; a profit-sharing contract denoted U1, a
one-part linear contract denoted U2, and a two-part linear contract denoted U3.
4.2.1 Profit-sharing contract
The uncertain benefit of flexibility influences the optimal volume of flexibility traded
in the contract. The supplier is o↵ered a percentage share of the joint profits and then
choose a volume of x kW based on the expected value of ↵ and  . As stated in Subsection
4.1.1 the supplier chooses the optimal value chain volume in a profit-sharing contract
and the maximization problem equals
max
x
E↵,  [⇡V C,U1(x)] = E↵,  [ ↵x2 +  x  ax2   b(1  ✓)x]
=
Z ↵¯
↵
Z  ¯
 
 ↵x2 +  x  ax2   b(1  ✓)x dF( )dF(↵)
(4.22)
By solving the integral based on the assumption that ↵ and   are independent of each
other, and following the same procedure as in Subsection 4.1.1 the flexibility supplied is
derived to be
xU1 =
E[ ]  b(1  ✓)
2(a+ E[↵])
(4.23)
If the actual values of the valuation coe cients di↵er from their expected values it will
clearly a↵ect the value chain profit as the supplied volume was sub-optimal. Since the
joint profit is divided between the parties in the contractual relationship, both parties
will be exposed to the uncertainty. For the supplier of flexibility, the risk sharing in
this case might lead to low willingness to accept this type of contract. Especially small
suppliers, as households, are believed to be risk averse and they are not interested in
undertaking financial risk as they face marginal gains by providing flexibility. The ex-
pected value chain profit is given by substituting (4.23) into (4.22)
E↵,  [⇡V C,U1] =
(b(1  ✓)  E[ ])2
4(a+ E[↵])
(4.24)
Since the benefit of flexibility is known to both parties in retrospect, the actual value
chain profit obtained can be derived by substituting (4.23) into the expression for joint
value chain profits in (4.1) and hence yields
⇡V C,U1 =
(b(1  ✓)  E[ ])(b(1  ✓)(a  ↵+ 2E[↵]) + a(E[ ]  2 ) + ↵E[ ]  2 E[↵])
4(a+ E[↵])2
(4.25)
The actual profits achieved by the participants depend on which extent the real values of
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the benefit valuation coe cients deviate from their expected values. The greatest impact
on the profit occurs when the valuation coe cients deviate in the same direction, i.e.
higher   and lower ↵ or vice versa. In reality it is natural to believe that the coe cients
are correlated and will always a↵ect the benefit in the same direction, hence the matter
of uncertainty will have a great impact on the profits obtained by the parties engaged
in the contract. Risk averse buyers are interested in sharing the risk with the supplier,
in which can be obtained in a profit-sharing contract between the supplier and buyer. .
Most buyers are risk averse in varying degrees. For grid companies, su cient flexibility
is crucial for their operation of the grid as the opposite can lead to major failures. Thus,
grid companies might be risk averse in the sense of not jeopardizing the reliability of the
grid. Large suppliers, i.e. industry suppliers, are willing to take upon more financial risk
than small suppliers like households as they face substantial higher gains from providing
flexibility and are capable of covering potential losses. Consequently, it is unlikely that a
supplier will engage in a profit-sharing contract under uncertainty as this is the contract
type with the highest associated financial risk. If one or both parties are risk averse, this
clearly impede the contractual relationship and a profit-sharing contract is not suitable.
4.2.2 One-part linear contract
In the one-part linear contract under uncertainty the buyer designs w based on the
expected value of the benefit. The optimal volume of flexibility chosen by the supplier is
based on the o↵ered wholesale price, and still given by (4.9). The buyer’s maximization
problem is
max
w
E↵,  [⇡B,U2(w)] = E↵,  [ ↵x2 +  x  wx] =
Z ↵¯
↵
Z  ¯
 
 ↵x2 +  x  wx dF( )dF(↵)
(4.26)
Applying the same solution method as in Subsection 4.1.2 the optimal wholesale price
w o↵ered by the buyer equals
wU2* =
aE[ ] + b(1  ✓)(E[↵] + a)
E[↵] + 2a
(4.27)
Unlike a profit-sharing contract, this contract allocates most of the risk to the buyer. As
the buyer faces uncertainty when the wholesale price is determined on expected values,
he might end up with a sub-optimal contract. When the true values of the coe cients, ↵
and  , di↵er from their expected values, the value chain profit will decrease compared to
the case with complete information. Nevertheless, a one-part linear contract handles the
uncertainty quite well for risk averse actors as the wholesale price is designed based on
expected values which means that the variance is minimized. The supplier’s profit is not
dependent on the relation between the expected and the actual value of the benefit, and
thus he does not face any risk associated with the uncertainty in this case. However, the
supplier obtains a higher profit in the case of complete information if it turns out that
the actual benefit was higher than the expected benefit. For small risk averse suppliers,
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this contract is well suited as they will not su↵er from the uncertain parameters and
have the opportunity to maximize profits based on the specified contract parameters.
4.2.3 Two-part linear contract
When introducing uncertainty in a two-part linear contract the buyer has to specify
both the wholesale price w and the lump sum L based on expected benefit and hence
the buyer’s maximization problem is
max
(w,L)
E↵,  [⇡B,U3(w,L)] = E↵,  [ ↵x2 +  x  wx  L]
=
Z ↵¯
↵
Z  ¯
 
 ↵x2 +  x  wx  L dF( )dF(↵)
(4.28)
s.t. ⇡S,U3   ⇡ S (4.29)
The optimal lump sum and wholesale price can be derived by using the same approach
as in Subsection 4.1.3 and becomes
L*U3 = ⇡
 
S  
a(b(1  ✓)  E[ ])2
4(E[↵] + a)2
(4.30)
and
w*U3 =
a(E[ ]  b(1  ✓))
a+ E[↵]
+ b(1  ✓) (4.31)
As in the one-part contract under uncertainty, the buyer’s profit depends on how the
valuation coe cients deviate from their expected values. In this contract the fixed lump
sum paid to the buyer a↵ects the allocation of risk. The deviations from optimal profit
caused by uncertainty are larger in a two-part linear contract than in a one-part linear
contract. Nevertheless, in most cases the two-part linear contract provides higher profits
to the buyer. The supplier does not face financial risk associated with uncertainty as
he choses the volume of flexibility supplied based on the specified contract terms, and
always ends up getting his reservation profit like in the case of complete information,
⇡S,U3 = ⇡S,C3 = ⇡
 
S . Consequently, if the supplier’s reservation profit is less or equal to
the supplier profit in a one-part linear contract the buyer will choose a two-part linear
contract unless he is substantially risk averse.
4.2.4 Illustrative study of uncertainty
To illustrate the impact of uncertain benefit on profits and allocation of flexibility, the
benefit coe cients are assumed to deviate both ways in an interval of 20% from actual
coe cients. The variables and profits are then calculated for various deviations com-
pared to the benchmark solution of the contracts in complete information.
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The numerical results given in Table 4.4 show that the profit in a two-part linear con-
tract deviates the most from the case with complete information. Figure 4.4 illustrates
the actual profits for the grid company when the contract is designed based on expected
values. Clearly, if the actual benefit deviates from its expected value, this has large
impact on the profit. At the same time this contract type yields the highest profit for
the buyer as long as the supplier’s reservation profit is less than or equal to the expected
profit for the supplier in a one-part linear contract, except with worst case deviation. In
the worst case deviation, i.e. low   and high ↵, a one-part linear contract obtains the
highest profits for the buyer due to the large deviation in the two-part linear contract.
In the two-part linear contract the supplier has a fixed reservation profit and therefore
the profit of the buyer might deviate to a greater extent from its expected value than in
a one-part linear contract where only the wholesale price is designed based on expected
values. Knowing this, the risk preference of the buyer decides which contract to choose.
The buyer will design the contract based on his expected profits and will in most scenar-
ios obtain higher profits with the two-part linear contract. However, a risk averse buyer
will prefer a one-part linear contract with less variance, and thus more certain income.
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Figure 4.4: Actual profits in a two-part linear contract for the grid company with
various benefits.
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Table 4.4: Deviation in profit for grid company under uncertainty compared with
complete information
Deviation from complete information [%]
Best case Worst case
One-part linear 5,3 12,1
Two-part linear 7,8 24,3
Profit-sharing 6,7 15,2
4.3 Contracting under Asymmetric Information
In most contractual relationships one or both of the parties have some private informa-
tion about some of their parameters, e.g. costs, e↵ort, willingness and benefit, that they
have an incentive to keep private. It is now assumed that the willingness parameter ✓ of
the supplier is private information and not known to the buyer. The probability function
dF (✓) of ✓ is known and ✓ is uniformly distributed within the interval [✓¯, ✓] where ✓
and ✓¯ represents high and low willingness respectively. This asymmetric information will
impact the contracts designed. The more informed agent may exploit the less informed
principal, thus acting opportunistically. Adverse selection is a possible consequence of
this opportunistic behavior of private information and creates a market failure by re-
ducing the size of a market or eliminating it, thus preventing desirable transactions
[25]. In this section the buyer is a Bayesian expected utility maximizer, anticipating the
suppliers’s subsequent behavior and optimizing accordingly within the set of available
contracts.
1. Contract designed and offered!
Buyer designs contract based!
on expected cost of flexibility"
and offers contract to supplier"
2. Volume is selected !
Supplier accepts (or rejects) the contract,!
and chooses volume of flexibility based!
on his maximization problem (and known!
cost)"
3. Supplier profit"
Supplier obtains a profit based!
on the specified payment and !
selected volume"
4. Buyer profit!
Buyer receives his profit!
based on the contract"
terms and volume traded"
Figure 4.5: Information timeline in the contractual relationship under asymmetric
information.
In the case of asymmetric information the buyer has the incentive to induce the supplier
to reveal his true costs to gain higher profit. A one-part linear contract o↵ers limited
contract flexibility and hence the buyer cannot achieve this with a one-part linear con-
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tract. Additionally, the previous sections stated that both the value chain profit and
buyer profit are highest in a two-part linear contract. Hence, the one-part linear contract
will not be investigated in this information scenario. Most linear contracts do not handle
information asymmetry in a good manner, and thus the contracts described earlier will
only be examined briefly. The main focus in this section is the introduction of a nonlin-
ear contract to deal with this challenge. The flow of information and decision stages are
indicated in Figure 4.5.
The contracts to be studied in this information scenario are a profit-sharing contract
denoted A1, a two-part linear contract denoted A2 and a nonlinear incentive compatible
contract denoted A3.
4.3.1 Profit-sharing contract
Asymmetric information often leads to ine cient profit-sharing contracts. If the cost
or benefit of flexibility is unknown to one of the parties, the other party might act
opportunistic to increase his own profit, and hence lower the total profit of the value
chain due to sub-optimality. The maximization problem under asymmetric information
becomes
max
x
E✓[⇡V C,A1(x)] = E✓[ ↵x2 +  x  ax2   b(1  ✓)x]
=
Z ✓
✓¯
 ↵x2 +  x  ax2   b(1  ✓)x dF(✓)
(4.32)
As the supplier cost is private information, the supplier might lie about the cost and
choose a volume deviating from the optimal volume for the value chain. By claiming a
higher cost than the actual cost, the supplier achieves a profit equal to
⇡S,A1 = E✓[⇡V C,A1](1  ⇢) + b ✓x (4.33)
where b ✓ is the additional gain from the di↵erence between the claimed and the real
value of ✓. Thus, the supplier obtains his part of the expected value chain3 profit plus
a mark up. It is believed that asymmetric information will be present in contracts
with small suppliers. Households can act opportunistically by easily lying about their
willingness and preferences, and thus demand a higher payment for providing flexibility.
Larger suppliers, as industry and commercial businesses, are not interested in violating
the trust in the contractual relationship and risk not to be o↵ered a new contract when
it expires. The buyers obtain lower profits under this information scenario due to the
opportunistic behavior of the supplier.
3Based on the expected willingness parameter.
51
CHAPTER 4. CONTRACT DESIGN
4.3.2 Two-part linear contract
In a two-part linear contract under asymmetric information the buyer’s optimization
problem is written as
max
w
E✓[⇡B,A2(w)] = E✓[ ↵x2 +  x  wx  L] =
Z ✓
✓¯
 ↵x2 +  x  wx  L dF(✓)
(4.34)
For any given w, the buyer always selects the highest L that still satisfies the supplier’s
individual rationality constraint given by the reservation profit for all ✓. Since ⇡S(✓) is
increasing in ✓, this constraint holds for all ✓ if it holds at ✓ = ✓¯. Thus, the optimal
lump sum L can be written as
L*A2 = ⇡
 
S  
a(b(1  ✓¯)   )2
4(↵+ a)2
(4.35)
Substituting this expression for L into (4.34) and noting that the resulting expression is
concave in w, we can solve the first-order condition for w to find that
wA2* =
b(1  E[✓])(↵+ a) +  a+ ab(1  ✓¯)
↵+ a
(4.36)
The information asymmetry means that the buyer must o↵er a smaller lump sum pay-
ment than before, i.e. L*A2  L*C3, to meet the ”worst-case” supplier’s reservation profit
requirements. To compensate, the buyer adds a markup based on how far removed the
”worst-case” supplier is from the mean, to the wholesale price. In a two-part linear
contract the trade-o↵ between e↵ort incentives and risk is evident. The buyer accepts
a lower lump sum to ensure that the supplier will engage in the contract, and hence he
chooses to give up a share of the profit. For the buyer of flexibility it is important that
the suppliers accept the contract, as he will not obtain any profits if they do not. Hence,
the buyer must ensure a su ciently high wholesale price and a low lump sum so even
the least willing suppliers will participate.
4.3.3 Nonlinear incentive compatible contract
When asymmetric information about cost structures is present, linear pricing tends to
be ine cient like described above. In lieu of employing traditional linear contracts the
following subsection will investigate a nonlinear contract by using mechanism design with
revelation principle adopted from Game Theory. The idea behind mechanism design is
to design an incentive structure that encourages the supplier to chose the e cient con-
tract and by so doing reveal his true cost [2]. The revelation principle is used to simplify
the problem. The model follows the same solution procedure as in [19].
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the supplier’s type only take two pos-
sible values. The discrete type model is su cient to highlight the main principles arising
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under asymmetric information without having to handle the technicalities of a contin-
uum of types [19]. The supplier can be either more willing ✓ or less willing ✓¯ to curtail
load with respective probabilities v and 1  v. The supplier’s cost functions are given by
C(x, ✓) = ax2 + b(1  ✓) with probability v (4.37)
or
C(x, ✓¯) = ax2 + b(1  ✓¯) with probability 1  v (4.38)
The buyer designs menu of contracts with given amounts of volumes with correspond-
ing fixed incentive payments and will compute the profit of any menu of contracts
{(y, x); (y¯, x¯)} in expected terms. Thus, the buyer’s maximization problem becomes
max
{(y,x);(y¯,x¯)}
⇡B,A3 = v
 
B(x)  y + (1  v) (B(x¯)  y¯) (4.39)
As there are only two supplier types the buyer knows the two possible values of ✓ and their
respective probabilities. The buyer must o↵er the supplier a utility level at least as high
as the utility level the supplier could obtain outside the relationship. These constraints
are referred to as the supplier’s participation constraints. The outside opportunity utility
level is set to the reservation profit of the supplier and hence the constraints are
y   ax2   b(1  ✓)x   ⇡ S (4.40)
y¯   ax¯2   b(1  ✓¯)x¯   ⇡¯ S (4.41)
Here y is the incentive payment to the supplier for a given volume of x delivered. This
payment schedule vary with the supplier type ✓. For the allocation to be e cient,
incentive compatibility constraints have to be introduced
y   ax2   b(1  ✓)x   y¯   ax¯2   b(1  ✓)x¯ (4.42)
y¯   ax¯2   b(1  ✓¯)x¯   y   ax2   b(1  ✓¯)x (4.43)
The incentive constraints encourage the supplier to tell the truth about his ✓. In Equa-
tion (4.42) the e cient supplier’s payment must be as much as he would make if he
were to mimic the ine cient supplier. The volumes must generally satisfy a mono-
tonicity constraint, and in this simple two-type model, adding (4.42) and (4.43) yields
x   x¯. Thus, incentive compatibility alone implies that the output requested from the
ine cient supplier cannot be higher than the output requested from the e cient supplier.
The asymmetry of information enables the e cient supplier to achieve a utility level
above his reservation profit by mimicking the ine cient supplier. Thus, the buyer have
to give up an information rent to the e cient supplier. The information rent to each
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type of supplier can be denoted by
U = y   ax2   b(1  ✓)x (4.44)
U¯ = y¯   ax¯2   b(1  ✓¯)x¯ (4.45)
If the e cient supplier mimic the ine cient supplier he would get U¯ +b ✓x¯. Even if the
ine cient supplier’s utility level is set to zero, the e cient supplier can obtain a positive
profit b ✓x¯. This positive information rent is generated by the informational advantage
the supplier has over the buyer of flexibility. By using the definition of the informa-
tion rents, the incentive payment y can be substituted such that the new optimization
variables become {(U, x); (U¯ , x¯)}. Substituting in the information rent and the benefit
functions the economic interpretations are easier to understand. The new maximization
problem is
max
{(U,x);(U¯ ,x¯)}
⇡B,A3v
  ↵x2 +  x  ax2   b(1  ✓)x 
+ (1  v)   ↵x¯2 +  x¯  ax¯2   b(1  ✓¯)x¯    vU + (1  v)U¯  (4.46)
subject to
U   ⇡ S (4.47)
U¯   ⇡¯ S (4.48)
U   U¯ + b ✓x¯ (4.49)
U¯   U   b ✓x (4.50)
Here (4.47) and (4.48) are the new participation constraints and (4.49) and (4.50) are
the incentive compatibility constraints. The maximization problem clearly states that
the buyer will accept some distortions away from the optimal output of the ✓¯-supplier
in order to decrease the ✓-supplier’s information rent. Thus, the solution to this prob-
lem is called a second-best solution and deviates from the e cient first-best solution
obtained under complete information, in which can be found in Appendix A.3.5. Gen-
erally, the technical di culty of incentive problems is to determine which of the many
constraints are binding at the optimum of the buyer’s problem [19]. The ability the
e cient supplier has to mimic the ine cient supplier implies that the e cient supplier’s
participation constraint (4.47) is always strictly satisfied. In addition, the ine cient
supplier’s incentive compatibility constraint is also irrelevant, since the di culty comes
from a e cient supplier willing to claim that he is ine cient rather than the reverse.
This leaves two binding constraints at optimum, the e cient supplier’s incentive com-
patibility constraint (4.49) and the ine cient supplier’s participation constraint (4.48)
leading to U¯ = ⇡¯ S as an optimal solution. Thus, U = b ✓¯x¯+ ⇡¯
 
S is also optimal. Sub-
stituting this into the buyer’s maximization problem and solving for (y, x); (y¯, x¯) yields
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x*A3 =
    b(1  ✓)
2(↵+ a)
(4.51)
x¯*A3 =
    b(1  ✓¯)
2(↵+ a)
 
✓
v
1  v
◆
b ✓
2(↵+ a)
(4.52)
y*
A3
= b ✓x¯*A3 + a(x
*
A3)
2 + b(1  ✓¯)x*A3 + ⇡ S (4.53)
y¯*A3 = a(x¯
*
A3)
2 + b(1  ✓¯)x¯*A3 + ⇡¯ S (4.54)
Compared with the complete information setting in the Appendix, asymmetric informa-
tion alters the buyer’s optimization by the subtraction of the expected rent that has to
be given up to the e cient supplier. This rent does only depend on the volume x¯ of
the ine cient supplier, hence the optimal output for the e cient supplier in (4.51) is
equal to the optimal output in the first-best solution. The second-best output for the
ine cient supplier is smaller than the first-best output, which corresponds to the buyer’s
trade-o↵ between ✓¯-output and the information rent given up.
πBSB = B(x) - y "
πBSB = B(x) - y "
USB = y – ax2 – b(1-θ)x "
USB = y – ax2 – b(1-θ)x "
x*  = xSB"x* "xSB     "
y "
x "
ySB "
ySB " A
* "
ASB "B* "
BSB "
C "
Figure 4.6: Optimal contract under asymmetric information indicated by subscript
SB. Adapted from [19].
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Figure 4.6 is a graphical representation of the second-best outcome. Under complete in-
formation the optimal contract is given by (A*, B*). An incentive compatible contract
(B*, C) can be constructed with the same output levels by giving the e cient supplier
a positive information rent. However, rather than requiring the first-best output level
for the ine cient supplier, the buyers wants to slightly decrease this output in order to
decrease the information rent. The optimal trade-o↵ occurs at the second-best outcome
(ASB,BSB).
The profit for the buyer is given by (4.46) with the optimal volumes of flexibility for
both supplier types given by (4.51) and (4.52). The e cient supplier receives a higher
profit than in complete information and is given by
⇡S,A3 = b ✓x¯
*
A3 + ⇡¯
 
S (4.55)
The ine cient supplier obtain a profit equal to his reservation profit
⇡¯S,A3 = ⇡¯
 
S (4.56)
In reality there will be more than two suppliers types, and the buyer of flexibility have
to design and o↵er a number of contracts in order to minimize the disadvantage of
asymmetric information. The buyer must typically design one set of menus to each of
the supplier segments, i.e. households, industry and commercial businesses. Asymmetric
information may be less present in some of the groups than others.
4.3.4 Illustrative study asymmetric information
Investigate how the asymmetry a↵ects the profit of the di↵erent parties in the various
contract types, It is clear that the asymmetric information is challenging for the buyer
when designing the contract. Nevertheless, by choosing the right type of contract the
asymmetry can be manageable. The optimal volumes of flexibility, wholesale prices, the
lump-sum as well as profits are calculated for the di↵erent contract types presented. A
sensitivity analysis illustrates the impact of deviating ✓’s from the expected value.
Table 4.5 illustrates that a profit-sharing contract performs poorly with information
asymmetry present. The worst case scenario occurs if the supplier of flexibility claims
that ✓ = 0, 3 while his actual ✓ = 1. In this case the supplier will obtain a larger profit
than case of complete information, while the buyer’s profit will decrease. Hence, the
buyer will su↵er from choosing a profit-sharing contract when asymmetry occurs due
to the opportunistic behavior of the supplier. As the table indicates there are small
deviations in profits. This is due to the low estimated value of the cost coe cient b.
Table 4.6 shows actual profits for the grid company if ✓ turns out to be 0,3 or 0,7 when
the expected value of this parameter is 0,5 in the design of the two-part linear and the
profit-sharing contract. In the nonlinear contract the buyer knows that the actual ✓ is
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Table 4.5: Hourly profits [NOK] in a profit-sharing contract for a grid company in a
worst case scenario.
Asymmetric information Complete information
Buyer profit 44 960 46 029
Supplier profit 20 787 19 727
Value chain profit 65 748 65 757
either 0,3 or 0,7. The calculations confirm that the nonlinear contract extracts higher
profits for the buyer independent of the suppliers actual willingness, and deals with the
asymmetric information in a better way. This occurs as the supplier reveals his true
willingness, and hence cost, and therefore the volume of flexibility chosen is based on
his true cost. In the profit-sharing contract the supplier will always claim to have the
highest cost, hence the buyer’s actual profit is equal regardless of the actual willingness.
Table 4.6: Comparing actual profits [NOK] for the grid company in various contracts.
Actual willingness
✓ = 0, 3 ✓ = 0, 7
Profit-sharing 45 265 45 265
Two-part linear 49 735 49 751
Nonlinear 50 384 50 387
A small supplier of flexibility, like a household, might prefer to relate to a fixed payment
for a specified amount of flexibility, like in a nonlinear contract, rather than being paid
a marginal price per kWh. For this reason, and the arguments mentioned earlier, the
buyer of flexibility should design a nonlinear incentive compatible contract to suppliers
in order to maximize profit. This contract type will be used in further discussion and
investigation of business opportunities of demand side flexibility.
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Chapter 5
Separate Flexibility Market
A contractual approach of trading flexibility might be economic ine cient in many sit-
uations because competitive prices are not fully considered in the selection of suppliers
providing flexibility. Contracts focus on flexibility benefits for only a subset of partici-
pants. Optimizing the benefits of flexibility individually in each contractual relationship
can result in conflicts on how the flexibility is scheduled as they solve di↵erent problems.
Additionally, partial approaches such as bilateral contracting result in lower returns for
suppliers as they are unable to o↵er their flexibility to all buyers [14]. Instead of trading
flexibility bilaterally between the buyer and the supplier, the flexibility can be aggre-
gated into a virtual pool where a market operator clears the market, and buyers and
suppliers of flexibility can trade. This chapter will illustrate a separate flexibility mar-
ket with various forms of market imperfections. All buyers and suppliers of flexibility
can access this market. The flexibility market and the participants are illustrated in
Figure 5.1. For simplicity, it is assumed throughout this chapter that the geographical
location of flexibility is insignificant. In reality, grid companies need flexibility to solve
local problems in the distribution grid and hence demands flexibility from suppliers in
a specific geographic location.
There are several approaches for clearing a market. In this thesis a price-quantity de-
mand curve is used to represent prices at which the buyers are willing to buy flexibility
of the corresponding volumes and the market operator clears the market by maximizing
total market benefit. The demand curve is derived from the marginal benefit functions
for various buyers of flexibility while the supply curve is defined by the marginal cost
functions for each supplier both described in Chapter 3. The clearing of this market
results in both a price and a volume of flexibility to be scheduled in the power system
for a given hour. It is assumed that the market operator receives supply and demand
based on the true costs and benefits of the market participants. This chapter will first
analyze a flexibility market with perfect competition. Further, market imperfections in
terms of monopoly and monopsony are investigated. Illustrative numerical examples
will be presented in each section and the complete calculations can be found in attached
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Excel-files1.Throughout this chapter the flexibility market is assumed to be separate
from the existing electricity market but is considered to operate synchronously with this
market as the two resources are physically linked.
The marginal value of flexibility constitute the aggregated market demand and is denoted
p(x) =  2↵Mx+  M (5.1)
where the subscript M is used to clearly indicate that the coe cients represent aggre-
gated valuation coe cients for all buyers. Likewise, the aggregated market supply is
denoted
c(x, ✓M ) = 2aMx+ bM (1  ✓M ) (5.2)
✓M is assumed known information by all participants. These demand and supply curves
are used throughout the chapter.
Market Operator!
Aggregator!
Supplier n!Supplier 1!
Retailers!
Supplier 1! Supplier 2!
Wind power 
producer! Grid companies!
Pool of flexibility!
Figure 5.1: Participants and interactions in a separate flexibility market.
5.1 Flexibility Market with Perfect Competition
The first section will model the flexibility market as perfectly competitive. In economic
theory, perfect competition refers to a market where no participants are large enough
to exercise market power and a↵ect the market price [?]. Each participant is seen
15 Separate Flexibility Market.xlsx
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as a price taker. The conditions for perfect competition are strict and few perfectly
competitive markets exist. A flexibility market with perfect competition is therefore
unlikely. However, perfect competition is Pareto e cient and will serve as a benchmark
for other market outcomes analyzed in this chapter.
5.1.1 Market clearing with perfect competition
A market operator should facilitate the flexibility market and clear the market given
the submitted demand and supply. Receiving demand and supply from all participants
the market operator can clear the market by finding an equilibrium volume of x and a
market price p(x). Equating (5.1) and (5.2) the market clears with the following optimal
output and market price
x* =
 M   bM (1  ✓M )
2(↵M + aM )
(5.3)
p*(x*) =  ↵M
✓
 M   bM (1  ✓M )
↵M + aM
◆
+  M (5.4)
This market outcome is e cient and hence a first-best solution to the market-based
approach. As seen by the to equations both the volume and the market price depend
on the aggregated valuation and cost coe cients. By definition, higher benefits result
in higher demand. Likewise, higher costs result in lower supply. Clearly the ratio of
demand and supply, and hence the benefits and costs decide the optimal market out-
come. (5.3) imply that an increased benefit will increase the equilibrium volume and
hence also the market price, while an increased cost will lower the equilibrium volume
and price. This is consistent with microeconomic theory. Buyers’ benefits are sensitive
to  , and it turns out that the size of each buyer’s   coe cient determines whether
or not they will participate in the market. If some buyers have significantly larger  
coe cients than others due to higher benefit, increasing the market price, the buyers
with low   or benefit will not participate in the market as a result of a higher price than
their valuation of flexibility.
Both equation (5.3) and (5.4) are similar to the optimal volume of x and the whole-
sale price w, respectively, in the two-part linear contract with complete information
presented in Subsection 4.1.3. The contractual and market-based approach will not nec-
essary give the same optimal price and volume owing to the fact that total demand
and supply might di↵er in the contractual relationship and in the flexibility market.
By assumption the buyer has bargaining power in the contractual relationship and will
therefore extract the larger share of the value chain profit by receiving a lump sum pay-
ment from the supplier. This is not possible in a market with perfect competition where
the buyer is a price taker without any market power. Unlike a two-part linear contract
where the buyer can extract profit with the lump-sum, the profit when buying in the
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market is only given by the buyer’s value of flexibility and the given payment for the
volume of flexibility x he buys
⇡B =  ↵x2 +  x  p(x)x (5.5)
Higher supply of flexibility lowers the market prices. For the buyers to have large enough
supply of flexibility available in a bilateral contract they have to engage in large number of
contracts with suppliers, which can be costly. If the flexibility market is well-functioning
with large turnover volumes, and if the participation fee and transaction costs2 are lower
than the cost of engaging in contracts, the buyer can benefit from trading in a market
instead in order to secure su cient volumes of flexibility at a lower cost. This again
depends on the buyer’s bargaining power in a contractual setting and his ability to ex-
ercise market power.
A supplier’s profit ⇡S in a flexibility market only depends on the market price and
his cost of supplying flexibility
⇡S = p(x)x  ax2   b(1  ✓)x (5.6)
Here x is the volume of flexible load that the individual supplier delivers at the given
market price. For a small individual supplier, e.g. a household, without any barging
power a flexibility market with perfect competition might be more e cient than a bi-
lateral contract with a buyer. In such a market the supplier receives a rightful price for
the flexibility he supplies and is able to provide flexibility to the whole range of buyers.
5.1.2 Illustrative study of perfect competition
Employing the estimated cost and valuation coe cients from Chapter 3 the equilibrium
price and volume is calculated from (5.3) and (5.4). The individual participant’s pro-
cured or provided volume of flexibility are derived from their demand and supply curve
whereas their profits are calculated from (5.5) and (5.6). Table 5.1 illustrates prices,
optimal volume of flexibility and profits in both a contractual relationship between a
grid company and a large supplier with complete information and in a flexibility market.
Total demand and supply are the same in both trading approaches, but it is assumed
that they represent several buyers and suppliers in the market instead of two large actors
as in the contract.
The numerical calculations of the benefit for grid companies are significantly higher
than the benefits for wind power producers and retailers, which forces the market price
above the level where these buyers can profit from trading. Thus, only grid companies
will trade in this flexibility market given the estimated benefits for each buyers. With
such a large gap in the benefits, this market will not be perfectly competitive since
2In a perfectly competitive market there are no transaction costs in the market. However, it is likely
that there will be a fee for trading in the flexibility market.
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Table 5.1: Comparison of a market with perfect competition and contracts under
complete information.
Market Bilateral contract
One-part linear Two-part linear
Marginal price [NOK/kW] 6,12 4,25 6,11
Optimal volume [kW] 9 704 6 690 9 704
Grid company
Profit [NOK] 35 536 44 582 50 818
Large supplier
Reservation profit [NOK] 13 845
Profit [NOK] 29 128 13 845 13 845
the grid companies have a significant influence on the market price due to their high
demand. However, if the grid companies do not realize the influence they have on the
price, they will still be price takers. Alternatively, they could collude to obtain lower
prices than if they take the price as given. As shown in Table 5.2 these results changes
when looking at a future scenario where imbalance costs for wind power producers and
retailers are doubled. Then retailers’   and hence their benefits are large enough for
them to participate in the market. The wind power producer on the other hand still
not profit from participating in the market. This scenario illustrates a more competitive
market where the market price is raised.
Table 5.2: Market outcomes in a present and future scenario with perfect competition.
Present scenario Future scenario
Market price [NOK/kW] 3,22 3,42
Grid company
Optimal volume x [kW] 13 538 13 281
Profit [NOK] 69 168 66 545
Retailer
Optimal volume x [kW] 0 543
Profit [NOK] 0 360
As the costs and benefits in these calculations are only estimates, the results will di↵er in
practice. However, in reality some buyers will value flexibility more than other buyers,
and research [12] propose that grid companies have the largest potential and thus the
largest benefit. For this reason, it is unlikely that a flexibility market is perfectly com-
petitive, and some actors, either on the supply side or the demand side will have some
degree of market power. Another criteria for perfect competition is that there are no
externalities. Flexibility, as a virtual resource, can a↵ect both the costs and benefits of
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actors in the power market, thus externalities might exist in this flexibility market and
prevent the market to be perfectly competitive. The possibility of large aggregators or
buyers to dominate in a local market will exhibit entry of new participants, decreasing
the market competition. The following sections will analyze two possible scenarios of
market power; a large supplier or an aggregator behaving as a monopoly or one buyer
capable of reducing the market price as a monopsony.
5.2 Supplier as a Monopolist
Assume that there is only one supplier of flexibility in the market. The supplier can
exploit this position to increase profit. By definition, monopoly is the ability of an actor
to profitably raise the market price of a good or service above marginal cost [?]. This
can be a plausible scenario in the power system if the flexibility market is operated
locally and one large aggregator has a portfolio consisting of flexibility from all suppliers
in the geographic area supplying the local market. The following section will present
the extreme case of this scenario where only one supplier has all the market power. In
reality, oligopoly with a few large aggregators and suppliers is more realistic.
5.2.1 Market clearing with monopoly
Instead of equating demand with supply to obtain an equilibrium volume as in perfect
competition, the supplier set the volume of flexibility where marginal cost equals to
marginal revenue and finds the corresponding price on the demand curve as seen in
Figure 5.2. Total revenue for the buyers is given by p(x)x where p(x) is the aggregated
demand given in (5.1). By equating the marginal revenue  4↵Ax+ A with the supplier’s
marginal cost in (5.2) the monopoly volume xml and price pml(xml) becomes
xml =
 M   b(1  ✓)
2(2↵M + a)
(5.7)
pml(xml) =  ↵M
✓
 M   b(1  ✓)
2↵M + a
◆
+  M (5.8)
Note that the cost coe cients in the supply curve are not aggregated since the supply
only consist of the marginal cost for the monopoly supplier. The marginal revenue curve
is twice as steep as the demand curve, and hence the marginal cost crosses this curve at
a lower volume x, raising the price which can be seen in the expressions for x and p(x).
Compared to the optimal price p*(x*) in perfect competition the first term in (5.8) has
a larger denominator and hence will decrease the negative term, which in turn raises the
monopoly price. The monopoly volume in (5.7) has a larger denominator than the ana-
lytical expression for the optimal volume in perfect competition, lowering the monopoly
volume. These results corresponds with microeconomic theory. Given the strictly de-
creasing demand curve, the volume is lowered when the price increases. However, by
setting a high market price, the supplier foregoes transactions with the buyers who value
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flexibility less than the market price, creating a deadweight loss from a socio-economic
perspective. This loss refers to potential gains that were neither extracted by the supplier
nor the buyers. The social welfare, i.e. the combined consumer and producer surplus,
is lower in the monopoly market due to this deadweight loss. E ciency in the form of
total gains from trade will not be reached in a monopoly setting.
p(x)!
x!
xml! x*!
p*(x*)!
pml(xml)!
p(x)!
c(x,θ)!
Figure 5.2: Market clearing of monopoly flexibility market.
A flexibility market where the suppliers have market power compares to bilateral con-
tracts where suppliers’ reservation profits or proportions of the shared joint profits are
high due to bargaining power. Nevertheless, it is harder for one or few suppliers to
exercise market power in a flexibility market compared to bilateral contracts since there
tends to be more participants in a market whereas a bilateral contract only consist of
two parties. Small suppliers will likely neither possess significant market power nor
bargaining power.
5.2.2 Illustrative study of monopoly
Using the same aggregated market demand and supply as in the previous section, as-
suming that one large supplier has access to the whole aggregated supply, the monopoly
price and volume are calculated from (5.7) and (5.8). The calculations shown in 5.3
illustrate the e↵ects on market price and volume compared the benchmark scenario with
perfect competition. Due to the high price in the monopolistic market, retailers will nei-
ther buy flexibility in the present nor the future scenario where their benefits are higher.
These results are reasonable to assume generally as well. A monopolistic supplier will
sell the flexibility to the buyers who value the resource most, and since grid companies
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might have larger potentials, other buyers will be extorted from the market. From a
socio-economic point of view, this flexibility market is ine cient and in the long run it
will be hard for the large supplier to maintain his position unless barriers hinder entry
of other market participants.
5.3 Buyer as a Monopsonist
Another form of market failure arises when there is only one buyer of a good, rather than
one seller as in the monopoly situation. This form of market power is called monopsony.
As a monopsonist, the buyer is able to buy flexibility at a price below its marginal value
of the resource. A flexibility buyer with monopsony power is a more likely scenario
than a supplier with monopoly power. Both grid companies, wind power producers and
retailers are large entities compared to individual suppliers, especially households. Thus
it is more realistic that these buyers will have larger shares of the market power than
a single supplier. However, this might not be true if the supply is aggregated by a
flexibility aggregator which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
5.3.1 Market clearing with monopsony
A monopsonist chooses a volume x at the intersection of the demand and marginal
expenditure curves as illustrated in Figure 5.3. Marginal expenditure is the additional
cost of buying one more unit of flexibility, i.e. 1 kWh [26]. Algebraically the total
expenditure curve is given by p(x)x where p(x) = c(x, ✓) is the market supply given in
(5.2). Equating marginal expenditure 4ax+b(1 ✓) with the demand or marginal value,
the monopsony volume xms becomes
xms =
    bM (1  ✓M )
2(↵+ 2aM )
(5.9)
The valuation coe cients are not aggregated as the demand is given by one buyer’s
marginal value. The supply curve defines the average expendtiure that the buyer must
pay for each volume x of flexibility. The monopsony price pms(xms) is found on the
average expenditure curve, i.e the supply curve, at the optimal monopsony volume
pms(xms) =
aM (    bM (1  ✓M ))
↵+ 2aM
+ bM (1  ✓M ) (5.10)
Compared to the perfect competition scenario, the monopsony volume is smaller which
can be easily verified since the denominator, as with monopoly, is larger than in the ex-
pression for optimal output in perfect competition. Consequently, as the demand curve
is strictly decreasing the market price in (5.10) is higher than in perfect competition.
As in monopoly the monopsony outcome is ine cient and creates a deadweight loss
shown by the shaded area in Figure 5.3. The buyers are better o↵ since his marginal
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expenditure is higher than average expenditure due to an upward-sloping supply curve.
The suppliers are worse o↵ since they are paid less while having the same costs of sup-
plying the flexibility. Additionally, the market clearing volume is smaller and hence
fewer suppliers are able to supply flexibility in the given hour compared to a competitive
situation.
p(x)!
x!
xms! x*!
p*(x*)!
pms(xms)!
p(x)!
(c(x,θ)x)’!
c(x,θ)!
Figure 5.3: Market clearing of monopsony flexibility market.
So far in this chapter it has been assumed that the value of flexibility is known by all
participants and that the true values are reflected in the market demand. However, as
discussed in the previous chapter the values of flexibility may be uncertain. With uncer-
tain benefits the demanded volume of flexibility from the buyer might deviate from the
optimal volume and this will cause market failure. The buyer face a larger risk trading
flexibility when the value is uncertain. Without any market power the higher risk may
result in low profits for the buyer since he can not a↵ect the market price and his ex-
penditures could turn out higher than the value. With uncertainty present monopsony
power can reduce this risk as the buyer is able to set the price below the lowest possible
marginal value if this value is within a known interval. From a socio-economic per-
spective this will cause even larger deadweight losses, and thus a lower market benefit.
This compares to a two-part linear contract as the optimal contract in Section 4.2 under
uncertainty where the buyer has large bargaining power, and thus extracting highest
profits even if this contract type result in largest deviations due to the uncertainty.
5.3.2 Illustrative study of monopsony
It is assumed in the market clearing that a large grid company as a monopsonist has a
demand equal to the sum of the two grid companies that forms the aggregated market
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demand in Subsections 5.1.2 and 5.2.2. The aggregated market supply is the same as in
previous calculations in this chapter. The monopsony volume and price are calculated
from (5.9) and (5.10) respectively. The numeric values of the market clearing price and
volume in Table 5.3 illustrates that both the price and the volume of flexibility traded
is lower than the competitive output. However, the monopsony volume of flexibility is
not as low as the monopoly output.
Table 5.3: Illustrative calculations of market imperfections in a flexibility market.
Perfect competition Monopoly Monopsony
Volume of flexibility [kW] 27 076 15 314 21 977
Market price [NOK/kWh] 3,22 7,66 2,64
Compared to present prices in existing electricity markets the market prices illustrated
in Table 5.3 are substantially higher in all scenarios. Note that the prices only apply
for hours with high demand for flexibility, and as all buyers by assumption demand
flexibility in the same hours, high demand hours will result in extreme prices. Addition-
ally, these prices are calculated for extreme scenarios where only one buyer or supplier
has all the market power. In reality market power will likely be shared between few
large participants in the market in lieu of just one. However, prices in Elspot and in
the Balancing Market are normally not higher than 2 NOK/kWh in peak hours today
[21]. Thus, retailers and wind power producers who use flexibility to reduce imbalance
cost, would be better o↵ paying the imbalance cost rather than buying flexibility at
the calculated prices. The calculations indicate that only grid companies will trade in
the flexibility market with their estimated benefit functions. The numeric values of the
prices in Table 5.3 are extremely sensitive to the benefit and cost functions derived for
each participant, and as they are estimates, they should only be employed to describe
the principles and not the actual possible price levels of flexibility in di↵erent scenarios.
Nevertheless, it is assumed that the variation in electricity prices will increase in the
future which induces more extreme prices, like in Denmark. Hence, it may be realistic
to assume that flexibility prices in peak hours also will be higher in the future.
If few actors are able to exercise market power in the flexibility market in the long
run it is reasonable to assume that there will be some form of regulation by competition
Authorities to prevent too high or low prices and ine cient allocation of the resources.
From the socio-economic view, the society are better o↵ if the flexibility market is op-
erated with many competitive buyers and suppliers of flexibility. In order to facilitate
such flexibility markets, existing barriers should be removed and the market must enable
all buyers to participate even if their demand of flexibility rely on supply from specific
geographic locations as with grid companies. The latter will be analyzed in the following
chapter.
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Novel Business Models for
Flexibility
Throughout this thesis a contractual and market-based approach of trading flexibility
have been presented and analyzed. Su cient volumes of demand and supply has been
taken as given. However, both demand and supply of flexibility are still uncertain in
the Norwegian power market, and also in many other countries. The major part of
the potential buyers do not realize the value of flexibility, hence they will not demand
this resource. Like the buyers, most suppliers do not know the value of flexibility, or the
costs for that matter, as they take electricity prices as given regardless of how much they
consume of the good. Hence, the incentives for providing flexibility are not present yet.
Most suppliers do not even have knowledge about flexibility as a resource. The smart
grid technology has been widely developed in recent years which enables the use of flex-
ibility as an additional resource in the electricity system. Nevertheless, small amounts
of flexibility are exploited today. The major challenge and uncertainty regarding use of
flexibility is available supply. Several changes have to be made in order to enable trading
of flexibility as well as to attract suppliers to provide flexibility. Various barriers make
it hard for new entrants in the power system to o↵er new and innovative solutions of
flexibility. Many researchers believe that aggregator roles are necessary as driving forces
to extract the potential of flexibility. Aggregators can both aggregate large volumes of
flexibility and o↵er this flexibility to potential buyers, making it easier for buyers to
utilize flexibility without changing their own business models.
Based on the existing challenge of small volumes of flexibility available for trading, this
chapter will introduce the aggregator role as a possible solution. The aggregator has
several opportunities to extract profit from flexibility. Thus various business models for
an aggregator will be presented and analyzed. It is assumed that market barriers have
been removed in order to arrange for trade of flexibility. All business models are based
on models presented previously in this thesis. The possibility of replacing aggregators
with local flexibility markets and advanced automated control systems will also be dis-
cussed. Figure 6.1 illustrates possible trading alternatives of flexibility and participants
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in various markets as well as the interactions in the system.
The first section introduces the aggregator in the value chain studied. Further, three
business models for the aggregator will be proposed, including trading in existing mar-
kets, bilateral contracting with buyers and suppliers as well as a combined model em-
ploying both trading solutions. Subsequently, a simple model shows how local flexibility
markets can solve system and reliability problems for all actors. Finally, future solutions
to release the potential of flexibility as well as e cient allocation of the resource will be
proposed. The chapter will consider how the theoretical models derived in this thesis
could work in practice, and how they could deviate. Simple numerical examples related
to each of the models are performed, and the complete calculations are found in attached
Excel-files1.
Bilateral 
Contracts 
Flexibility 
Market 
Electricity 
Markets 
Aggregator 
Grid Company Wind Power 
Producer 
Retailer 
Industry Households Commercial  Businesses 
Suppliers of 
Flexibility 
Buyers of 
Flexibility 
Figure 6.1: Business models for flexibility including participants and trading methods.
6.1 Aggregators’ Business Opportunities
The previous two chapters has shown the importance of su cient supply in order to
reach an e cient allocation of flexibility as well as allocate the value this resource brings
along. One major challenge related to releasing the potential of flexibility is to aggregate
large enough volumes of flexibility from suppliers, whether it is traded in a contract or
in a market. An aggregator role is proposed by many researchers in the energy business
sector as a solution to this challenge. Aggregators can o↵er attractive solutions and
new services to individual suppliers giving the suppliers su cient incentives to provide
16 Novel Business Models.xlsx.
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flexibility. By so doing the aggregator acts as a driving force for releasing the potential
of flexibility. An aggregator can o↵er the suppliers a payment in order to control their
loads according to given restrictions. In addition the suppliers can receive reduced elec-
tricity and grid tari↵s if the aggregator manages to reduce or shift load in peak load
hours with high prices.
Aggregators have several possible opportunities of flexibility to build business models
upon. The first step for an aggregator is to attract large flexibility portfolios, and in
order to do so he has to buy flexibility from suppliers. It is natural to assume that an
aggregator will form contracts with suppliers. To avoid problems with asymmetric in-
formation a nonlinear contract is suggested as the trading method and will be employed
in further analysis. For a third party aggregator without any existing relationships with
the suppliers this will be a time consuming process and crucial for the aggregator’s long
term existence.
After the aggregator has collected a flexibility portfolio he should investigate all the
opportunities for selling this flexibility and find the optimal schedule to maximize prof-
its. As suggested so far in this thesis two major trading methods of flexibility are
possible. As a relatively large actor an aggregator is able to form bilateral contracts
with large buyers of flexibility. Depending on the competition among aggregators and
the size of the portfolio, an aggregator may have bargaining power in contracts as well
as market power. Thus an aggregator can possibly utilize each trading area if there
are no entry barriers. This chapter will analyze three various business models for the
aggregator: selling flexibility in existing electricity and reserve markets by submitting
bids of flexibility as supply, bilateral contracting with various buyers and a combined
model with trading both in markets and through contracts. Moreover, an aggregator is
faced with a complex maximization and scheduling problem and must deal with both
the suppliers of flexibility and the buyers, as well as operate in several di↵erent markets
with varying time frames. This evidently require advanced controlling systems and huge
amounts of knowledge about the power system and actors participating in electricity
and flexibility markets. Another complicating factor of the aggregators’ problem is the
large number of relationships the aggregator has to engage in with the various agents,
especially suppliers. Additionally, contractual relationships are often characterized by
asymmetric information as discussed in Section 4.3 , complicating the decision making
and scheduling processes.
Although many researchers believe that aggregators are required in order to exploit
flexibility, it is not obvious from an economic point of view why an additional party in
the value chain would be e cient nor increase social surplus. Buyers could buy flexibil-
ity directly from suppliers like illustrated in Chapter 4. For instance, retailers already
have customer relationships with electricity consumers and can utilize this contact and
built-up trust to reduce their imbalance costs and place flexible bids in Elspot. Nev-
ertheless, aggregating flexibility from suppliers require time and costs, and these tasks
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may fall outside the buyers’ core businesses. An aggregator specializing in aggregating
and selling flexibility may be able to do this at a lower cost. This could possibly result
in a higher social surplus, as illustrated with the following simple example. If a buyer
contract directly with suppliers his profit is defined as
⇡B = B(x)  c(x)x  FB (6.1)
Here B(x) is the buyer’s benefit of procuring flexibility, c(x) is the marginal cost for each
unit flexibility he buy, i.e payments to the suppliers, and FB is a fixed cost of aggregating
supply. The aggregator’s profit if he contracts with suppliers is defined as
⇡A = p(x)x  c(x)x  FA (6.2)
where p(x) is the price for each volume of flexibility x he sells to the buyer, c(x) is the
marginal cost he has to pay suppliers, which is assumed equal for both the buyer and
the aggregator and FA is a fixed cost of aggregating supply. c(x) is by assumption the
same regardless of who is buying from the suppliers, hence suppliers’ profits are equal
in both value chains. Assuming that aggregator’s fixed cost is lower than the buyer’s,
all else held equal2, this results in a higher value chain profit and hence overall social
surplus in the long run
⇡AV C = ⇡
B
V C + (FB   FA) (6.3)
Here ⇡AV C > ⇡
B
V C following from FA < FB where ⇡
A
V C and ⇡
B
V C are value chain profits
with and without an aggregator, respectively. Note that Equation (6.3) do not indicate
how the profits are allocated within the value chain, only the size of the overall profit is
illustrated.
Even though aggregators manage to aggregate flexibility at a lower cost than the buy-
ers, their long term existence face other threats. Sophisticated control systems can
automate tasks like aggregating supply and scheduling flexibility. Supply can for in-
stance be bid directly into a market, taking predetermined restrictions into account.
With well-functioning control systems the aggregator role may be redundant in the long
run. However, for such systems to exist high investments have to be made, and it is not
clear who should cover these costs.
6.2 Contract Design with an Aggregator
When introducing an aggregator as a new role in the value chain this will a↵ect the way
of designing contracts and how profits are allocated between the parties compared to
the situation with only a buyer and supplier of flexibility. As a new market player, it is
natural to assume that the aggregator has the incentive to design and o↵er contracts to
both buyers and suppliers of flexibility. In this section the contracts o↵ered by aggrega-
tor are simple bilateral contracts.
2Both demand and supply could di↵er when the value chain does not consist of the same actors.
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As stated in Chapter 4, the contract terms and the allocation of profit in the value
chain are highly dependent on the bargaining power of the actors, and by o↵ering the
contract the aggregator might have an advantage in the contract relationship. However,
the profit obtained by the aggregator depends on the reservation profits of the buyers
and suppliers. The aggregator’s fixed cost FA will not a↵ect the design of an optimal
contract but is essential to determine the existence of this role in the long run.
6.2.1 Aggregator and supplier of flexibility
The contractual relationship with suppliers of flexibility is essential for the aggregator’s
business opportunities and is illustrated in Figure 6.2.The Aggregators’ profit is highly
dependent on the payment schedule of flexibility to suppliers and the volume of flexi-
bility they manage to aggregate from the suppliers. The contracts should be designed
to attract enough suppliers to aggregate a large portfolio of flexibility. An attractive
contract will provide the suppliers with the right incentives to participate in such an
agreement.
As mentioned in Section 6.1, a potential complicating factor in the aggregator’s maxi-
mization problem is the information asymmetry. When designing contracts between an
aggregator and the suppliers of flexibility, it is realistic to assume that the marginal cost
and willingness of supplying flexibility is private information for the suppliers. Based
on the investigation and analyses of di↵erent contract types in Chapter 4, a nonlinear
incentive compatible contract is considered to be the optimal contract to deal with this
challenge.
SUPPLIERS!
Household, Industry,!
Commercial Business!
Flexibility contract!
Flexibility!
Financial!
compensation!
AGGREGATOR!
BUYERS!
Grid Companies,!
Retailers, Producers!
of Renewable Energy!
Contracts / Market!
Flexibility!
Financial!
compensation!
Figure 6.2: Contractual relationship between a supplier and an aggregator.
For mathematical convenience it is assumed that the aggregator only faces two types of
suppliers, with high and low willingness respectively. The aggregator gain p(x) per kW
flexibility, either from a market or through bilateral contracts with buyers. The aggre-
gator is assumed to be a price taker when trading in the market and hence the volume
of flexibility does not influence the market price. In reality this assumption yields if the
aggregator trades in existing markets with large turnover volumes or in large flexibil-
ity markets with many suppliers. The maximization problem of the aggregator when
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contracting with two types of suppliers is given by
max
{x,y}
⇡A = v(p(x)x  y) + (1  v)(p(x)x¯  y¯)  FA (6.4)
subject to (7.19) to (4.43)
where the restrictions are specified in Subsection 4.3.3.
The marginal and fixed cost addressed to the aggregator’s business of flexibility is un-
certain. Typically, the aggregator faces large investment costs of advanced controlling
systems in the beginning, and a marginal cost of each volume of flexibility he buys. The
aggregator may have additional variable costs associated with trade. For simplicity it is
assumed that the aggregator does not have a marginal cost of buying flexibility except
for the payment to the suppliers. By using the same procedure as in Subsection 4.3.3
the following menu of contracts {(x, y), (x¯, y¯)} is o↵ered to the supplier
x =
p(x)  b(1  ✓)
2a
(6.5)
x¯ =
p(x)  b(1  ✓¯)
2a
 
⇣ v
1  v
⌘b ✓
2a
(6.6)
y = b x¯+ ax2 + b(1  ✓)x (6.7)
y¯ = ax¯2 + b(1  ✓¯)x¯ (6.8)
The aggregator’s profit from contracting with one supplier equals
⇡A = p(x)x  y (6.9)
and the total profit of the aggregator can be found by summing the individual profits
obtained from each supplier. The supplier profit becomes
⇡S = y   ax2   b(1  ✓)x (6.10)
The further investigation of new business models and opportunities for an aggregator
will be based on this type of contract between the aggregator and supplier of flexibility.
6.2.2 Aggregator and buyer of flexibility
The buyers of flexibility account for a large part of an aggregator’s profit. Actors with
high benefits of flexibility will provide substantial revenues and hence a key issue for an
aggregator is to design the right type of contract to maximize profits. It is important for
the aggregator to acquire information about the need for flexibility for di↵erent buyers
and by doing so, value the benefit of flexibility. In reality the information available may
vary, but for simplicity it is here assumed that the benefit of flexibility is known to all
parties. As shown in Chapter 4 a two-part linear contract is well suited in this scenario.
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SUPPLIERS!
Household, Industry,!
Commercial Business!
Flexibility contract!
Flexibility!
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Figure 6.3: Contractual relationship between a buyer and an aggregator.
In this contractual relationship the aggregator is assumed to have a cost cA(x) of
buying flexibility from the suppliers and a fixed administrative cost FA. The value of
cA is determined by the contract type the aggregator has with the supplier of flexibility.
The aggregator need to solve the following maximization problem
max
(w,L)
⇡A = wx+ L  cAx  FA (6.11)
when he knows that the buyer profit is given by
⇡B =  ↵x2 +  x  wx  L (6.12)
s. t. ⇡B   ⇡ B (6.13)
By using the same approach as in Subsection 4.1.3 the optimal hourly volume of flexibility
x in kW is
xAB =
    w
2a
(6.14)
and the aggregator will o↵er the following combination of lump sum3 and wholesale price
to the buyer
LAB =  ↵x2 +  x  wx  ⇡ B (6.15)
wAB = cA (6.16)
From this derivation it can be verified that the profits of the aggregator and buyer can
be expressed as
⇡A = L  FA (6.17)
⇡B = ⇡
 
B (6.18)
Clearly, in the scenario with complete information about the buyer’s benefit of flexibility
the aggregator is able to extract all profits excess the reservation profit of the buyer by
using the lump sum. However, in reality it is likely that a large buyer will have significant
bargaining power and hence a high reservation profit. The authors believe that a grid
company postponing investments by utilizing flexibility is interested in engaging in a
long-term contractual relationship with the aggregator and is willing to pay a large
lump sum to secure su cient flexibility available. In contrast, retailers and wind power
3The lump sum is defined as a payment from the buyer to the aggregator as, by assumption, the
aggregator designs the contract.
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producers have more uncertain needs for flexibility and might be less willing to commit
to a long-term contract and pay a large fixed sum. The wholesale price and lump sum
presented in (6.16) and (6.15) respectively provides a basis for further discussion and
analysis when investigating the business models for an aggregator.
6.3 Aggregator as a Participant in Existing Markets
Today, only very large consumers can participate on the supply side in existing electricity
markets based on their flexible consumption volumes. Additionally, there exists market
barriers and requirements for participation as high yearly fees, minimum bidding volumes
and balancing responsibility. Small suppliers of flexibility, as households and other small
scale industry, do not have market access, and thus an aggregator is required to realize
the potential value of flexibility in the various markets. The profit obtained for the
aggregator depends on the market price and the volume traded. The aggregator can
choose to provide flexibility in the market either by bidding reduced load, as supply, or a
price elastic demand curve. In the following subsection the first alternative is considered.
The cost of flexibility is specified by the bilateral agreement between the aggregator and
the supplier, here in terms of a single household. To get an impression of the realized
profits the hourly profits are aggregated to a yearly profit for both parties. The aim
of this section is to investigate in which markets the aggregator will gain from trading.
The markets to be studied are Elspot, the Balancing Market and the Reserves Option
Market and the aggregator’s business model solely ofcus on trading in one of these.
Other markets as Elbas and the Secondary Reserves Market are not included in this
analysis but could be interesting to study in further research. Especially the Secondary
Reserves Market might provide high returns due to high prices and large volumes.
6.3.1 Elspot
As Elspot is a day-ahead market, the market participants might face imbalance costs if
they fail to deliver or consume the submitted volume. For an aggregator these costs can
occur if the actual volume of flexibility deviates from the volume bid in Elspot. One of
the main market barriers for entry of an aggregator in Elspot is the minimum volume
requirements and the fixed yearly participation fee. Additionally, the aggregator must
have balance responsibility, or cooperate with a balance responsible party. The aggre-
gator will likely also face high annual costs of hourly metering [5].
The market clearing in Elspot is done by the SESAM calculation and is based on an ap-
plication of the social welfare criterium in combination with market rules [24]. SESAM
is maximizing the value of the objective function subject to physical constraints. The
simplified objective function, the social welfare ciriterium, is given by
max
X
n
⇢Z da
0
Da(x)dx 
Z sa
0
Sa(y)dy
 
(6.19)
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Here, a represents an area, da is demand in area a and Da is the demand function in
area a, sa is supply in area a and Sa is the supply function in area a and n is the number
of areas. The model expresses that social surplus, consumers’ utility minus producers’
cost, shall be maximized subject to minimal requirements about volumes, area balance,
transmission capacities, maximal transmission ramp rates, accepted bids and price dif-
ference between areas.
In Elspot, the flexibility can either be included as elastic demand curves, or in the
supply curve by reducing load. These situations are illustrated in Figure 2.4 in Chapter
2 and Figure 6.4 respectively. When the flexibility is handled as supply, the aggregator
compete against other power producer about delivering flexibility. It is believed that
the cost of flexibility will be equal to or lower than the spot price. Today end-users
have indirectly access to Elspot through their retailer. A retailer undertaking the role
of an aggregator can use the flexibility to bid price elastic demand curves in Elspot.
The increased elasticity of demand will lead to lower price variations, and additionally
decrease the market clearing price for electricity.
p(x)!
x!
Supply with 
flexibility (DR)!
Supply!
p(x)!
pDR(x)!
x! xDR!
Demand!
Figure 6.4: Bidding flexibility as supply in Elspot.
By aggregating multiple suppliers of flexibility, the aggregator can meet the volume
requirements for participating in Elspot. It is also assumed that the aggregator has
potential to be a balance responsible entiy in the power system. Hence, he can submit
bids of flexibility as supply in Elspot and receive spot price for the accepted bids. It is
reasonable to assume that the volume of flexibility traded by the aggregator does not
impact the spot price since there are large turnover volumes in Elspot. The aggregator
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buys flexibility from a supplier through a bilateral contract as described in subsection
6.2.1, and when selling the flexibility in Elspot the aggregator’s profit becomes
⇡SA(x) = v(p
S(x)x  y) + (1  v)(pS(x)x¯  y¯)  FA   CR(x) (6.20)
where pS(x) is the hourly spot price and CR(x) is the regulating cost if imbalance occurs.
The latter is neglected in the following calculation. Volumes for the e cient x and the
ine cient supplier x¯ are here given by
x =
pS(x)  b(1  ✓)
2a
(6.21)
x¯ =
pS(x)  b(1  ✓¯)
2a
  v
1  v
✓
b ✓
2a
◆
(6.22)
As can be seen from (6.21) and (6.22) the volume of flexibility required from the suppliers
depends on the spot price for electricity. Low spot price leads to low volumes and
additionally low profit for the aggregator. The incentive payments to the suppliers are
the same as in (6.7) and (6.8). By bidding flexibility into Elspot the spot price and
turnover volume will decrease, thus building and investing in new generators for peak
load hours can be avoided. The price variations are relatively small and the present
spot prices are low. In addition profits are uncertain as this is an day-ahead market and
imbalances may occur. Consequently, it is assumed that an aggregator can gain more
profit from participating in other markets or by exploiting other business models.
6.3.2 The Balancing Market
The Balancing Market is activated due to imbalance in the system. The market partici-
pants can submit bids for both upward and downward regulating power. The regulating
prices for upward regulation are usually higher than in the spot market. Today, most
of the market participants are large hydro power producers with low marginal produc-
tion costs and therefore the regulating prices are relatively low. In other countries with
expensive peak load power plants, the regulating prices are significantly higher. It is
assumed that flexible consumption will have a lower marginal cost than most producers,
and hence the regulating prices might decrease when bidding flexibility into the Balanc-
ing Market.
Like in Elspot, there are certain requirements for participating in the Balancing Market.
First, the aggregator must be approved by the TSO to have balance responsibility. As
discussed in the previous subsection this is a barrier that can be overcome. Second there
are restrictions on combined delivery, and hence an aggregator cannot combine produc-
tion and consumption devices in its portfolio. Additionally, there are requirements for
minimum volume, duration and response time of 15 minutes [30]. The short response
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time demanded creates the need for advanced real-time communication equipment be-
tween the aggregator and the suppliers, and high annual and one-o↵ costs might arise.
Additionally both day-ahead and intra-day communication are required as operational
schedules for every 5 minutes have to be sent the day before operation. The threshold of
10 MW requires a large number of suppliers to be managed by the aggregator and this
will make it di cult to manage operational schedules as many consumers have stochastic
behavior [5].
The Balancing Market is cleared by sorting the regulating bids in merit order and the
hourly regulating price pBM (x) is determined by the highest bid activated in the respec-
tive hour. The aggregator is assumed to be a price taker in this market as well and the
profit of the aggregator submitting bids of flexibility in the Balancing Market becomes
⇡BMA (x) = v(p
BM (x)x  y) + (1  v)(p(x)BM x¯  y¯)  FA (6.23)
where pBM (x) is the upward regulating price since the aggregator is assumed to only
submit bids for upward regulation. Here x and x¯ are given by
x =
pBM (x)  b(1  ✓)
2a
(6.24)
x¯ =
pBM (x)  b(1  ✓¯)
2a
  v
1  v
✓
b ✓
2a
◆
(6.25)
The incentive payments to the suppliers are still given by (6.7) and (6.8). The trade-o↵
between trading in Elspot and the Balancing Market is given by the market price as
well as the realized volume. By definition pBM   pS , but at the same time the turnover
volumes are often smaller in the Balancing Market. Hence, it is di cult to argue in
which of these markets the aggregator will obtain a larger profit, but if it is assumed
that equal volumes of flexibility are activated in each of the markets this will result in
⇡BMA   ⇡SA. However, it is uncertain wether the bids submitted are activated or not.
6.3.3 The Reserve Option Market
In both Elspot and the Balancing Market the aggregator cannot be certain that his bids
are activated and might face low or no income. Additionally, his profit in these markets
are dependent on the market price and the bidding volume as can be seen from (6.20)
and (6.23). Due to this challenge it is interesting to investigate the Reserve Option
Market as a possible market for the aggregator to sell flexibility. Because of the high
minimum volume requirements for trading in this market and the long duration of the
options, small suppliers of flexibility, i.e. households and commercial businesses, will not
be able to participate. This opens up a large potential for the aggregator to submit bids
on behalf of these suppliers with an aggregated portfolio.
The price setting of the option premium exploits the principle of marginal pricing [31].
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All accepted bids receives the same price in each price area given by the highest accepted
price. If the supplier cannot activate flexible power in every hour during the week, he
can restrict the bid with a specified number of resting hours between two activations.
The maximum amount of resting time is 8 hours per week, and these hours reduce the
option premium. The supplier can also restrict the length of an activation period. If
the length of activation is 4 hours or less, the option premium will be reduced as well.
Thus, these restrictions have to be taken into account when deciding the option premium
paid to the aggregator. The option premium O(x) for having x MW power available is
calculated as
O(x) = ⌘ pROM(x)x (6.26)
where ⌘ and   are the truncation rate for restricting the length of activation and resting
time respectively. These rates are determined by Statnett as the TSO. If the seller of
the option violate the obligation to supply flexibility, Statnett will reduce the option
premium. The penalty A(x) can be found as
A(x0) =  m(x)x0t (6.27)
where  is a factor corresponding to the truncation rate of the option premium, x0 is
the volume of inaccessible power and t is the duration of the inaccessibility of the power.
In practice, the penalty will not be larger than the option premium. The penalty is
neglected in the numerical and analytical calculations. In some operational hours a need
to obtain additional regulating power in certain areas arises. In these situations the
TSO can accept bids with a higher price, without influencing the market price. Such
options are called special options and they will receive a price equal to the bidding price,
i.e.”pay-as-bid”.
If the aggregator manage to aggregate a large portfolio of flexibility he can partici-
pate in the Reserve Option Market in lieu of only the Balancing Market. By doing
so, the aggregator receives an option premium for placing a certain volume of available
flexibility. For simplicity, it is assumed that the aggregator only pays the suppliers for
activated flexibility. The aggregator’s maximization problem in this market becomes
max
{x,y})
⇡ROMA = v
 
pBM(x)x  y + (1  v)  pBM(x)x¯  y¯ +O(x) (6.28)
Note that this is a one-to-one relationship between the aggregator and a single supplier.
Here O(x) is a share of the total option premium for providing flexibility given in (6.26)
and pBM(x) is the regulating price that the aggregator receives by activating flexibility
in the Balancing Market. By using the same solution procedure as in Subsection 6.2.1,
the incentive compatibility contracts give the following volumes
x =
pBM(x)  b(1  ✓)
2a
(6.29)
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x¯ =
pBM(x)  b(1  ✓¯)
2a
  v
1  v
✓
b ✓
2a
◆
(6.30)
The incentive payments are still given by equation (6.7) and (6.8). Compared to the
situation where the aggregator only sells flexibility in the Balancing Market, the aggre-
gator now receives a fixed option premium regardless of how much flexibility is actually
activated in the Balancing Market. This fixed premium can make the aggregator’s profit
less uncertain. However, the aggregator has to reserve volumes of flexibility over a longer
time period when trading in this market, in which can decrease the opportunity for the
aggregator to achieve profits through other business models.
6.3.4 Illustrative study of trading flexibility in existing markets
To illustrate the profit for the aggregator in the di↵erent markets and evaluate in which
markets he can obtain the highest profits, some illustrative calculations have been per-
formed. The calculations are based on hours with relatively high prices as flexibility
often is needed in these hours. As shown in Table 6.1 both the hourly and yearly profits
from selling flexibility bought from one supplier in Elspot are low due to the low elec-
tricity price compared to the estimated cost of supplying flexibility. On a yearly basis,
when aggregating over 10 000 households, the aggregator obtain a significantly higher
profit, but this profit is highly dependent on the market price hence the aggregator faces
uncertain income. The supplier faces less financial risk since he receives the reserva-
tion profit regardless of the size of the market price. It should be emphasized that the
supplier additionally will gain from lower electricity bills4 by reducing load or shifting
load to hours with a lower electricity price. This gain is substantially higher than the
payment from the aggregator.
Table 6.1: Profits from bidding flexibility in Elspot in a high price scenario.
Profits [NOK] Hourly benefit Yearly profit Yearly gain from
reduced load
E cient supplier 0,10 45,70 326,88
Ine cient supplier 0,05 21,90 331,09
Aggregator 0,29 126,39
Aggregator (10K
households)
2886 1 263 860
In order to compare profits obtained in the various markets, it is assumed that the ag-
gregator has an available volume of 5 000 kW flexibility in a given hour. The whole
4Here it is assumed that the supplier have a spot price contract with the retailer and is paying the
actual spot price for each hour
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volume of flexibility in the portfolio is activated in Elspot while only 1 000 kW is acti-
vated in the Balancing Market. In the Reserve Option Market the aggregator receives
an option premium to make the entire portfolio available. As can be seen from Table 6.2
the aggregator obtains highest profit when trading in the Reserve Option Market due to
the option premium. Nevertheless, it is uncertain how large volumes are accepted in this
market and if the aggregator have a limited portfolio of flexibility he should optimize the
utilization of this flexibility by considering the probability of when the peak-load hours,
and thus the highest prices occur. In the future the regulating prices might increase
which can result in higher profits from the Balancing Market and the Reserve Option
Market. When trading flexibility in existing markets the aggregator will face high costs
associated with advanced meters and controlling systems so the profits presented in these
calculations will most likely be lower in reality.
Table 6.2: Comparing revenues [NOK] for the aggregator in various existing markets.
Elspot Balancing Market Reserve Option
Market
Weekly option premium 50 000
Option premium per
activated kW in BM
10 000
Revenue aggregator 5 441 1763 11 763
The three existing market opportunities clearly represent trade-o↵s for the aggregator.
By trading in Elspot the aggregator can activate large volumes, but face uncertainty
with imbalance costs and low spot prices. Sacrificing activated volumes the aggregator
obtains higher prices and no imbalance costs in the Balancing Market. The Reserve Op-
tion Market, on the other hand, require binding up large volumes over time in return for
an option premium, thus sacrificing alternative use of the flexibility. The aggregator’s
load scheduling problem should include these trade-o↵s.
The existing electricity markets, and especially the Reserves Option Market, provide
important business opportunities for an aggregator. Nevertheless, by trading flexibility
in these markets the problems that many actors face in the present power market are not
fully solved as the flexibility only adjusts prices and provides electricity reserves. Hence
the full value of flexibility described previously is not realized. Therefore the aggregator
should expand his business model by simultaneously trading flexibility bilaterally with
buyers who are not able to participate in these market.
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6.4 Combined Business Model for an Aggregator
A combined business model can expand the horizon of flexibility by both selling excess
flexibility in specified markets as well as trade through bilateral contracts. As stated
in previous chapters, some actors have limited access to markets or are excluded from
various trading methods due to lack of profit. By engaging in di↵erent trading methods,
the aggregator can reach out to more buyers. Additionally, in reality buyers of flexibility
will not demand flexibility in the exact same hours, and thus the aggregator can optimize
the value of his flexibility portfolio by exploiting this. The trade-o↵ between di↵erent
trading methods for an aggregator will be discussed in this section. It is assumed that
the aggregator has a certain volume of flexibility available to a given price, and hence
only the aggregator’s revenue is studied here.
6.4.1 The trade-o↵ between contracts and markets
The aggregator faces a trade-o↵ between the volume of flexibility to be bound in con-
tracts and the volume of submitted bids in a market, and it is di cult to calculate the
optimal combination of these methods without using an advanced optimization model5.
When determining the optimal combination, the aggregator must consider the alter-
native value of other opportunities. Market barriers, market access, bargaining power
and other complicating factors should also be taken into account. The aggregator must
ensure su cient flexibility available to cover all his agreements at any time, as he will
incur large penalty costs if he fails to do so. The aggregator’s profit when operating with
a combined business model can be described as
max⇡CBMA = ⇡
M
A ⇢+ ⇡
C
A(1  ⇢) (6.31)
where ⇡MA is the profit obtained from trading in existing markets, pi
C
A is the profit from
bilateral contracts with buyers and ⇢ indicates the allocation of flexibility. As the ex-
pression states, the flexibility should be allocated to where it is valued the most. In
contracts, the aggregator has the opportunity to determine the rules by designing the
contract and specifying the contract terms. It is believed that buyers requiring secure
supply, as grid companies, would prefer to engage in contracts rather than markets to
ensure a su cient volume of flexibility available at all time. In contrast, retailers and
wind power producers might be less interesting in committing on a long-term perspec-
tive as their problems are related to more unpredictable incidents. However, these actors
might be willing to engage in contract on a seasonally basis, as the regulating prices are
higher during the winter. Short-term contracts with certain actors could be combinable
with long-term contracts, and can ensure that excess flexibility in given periods is sold.
In the existing electricity markets the aggregator can obtain profits by optimizing bids
submitted in the di↵erent markets. To do so, the aggregator needs an advanced opti-
mization model considering the frequency of events and timing of the peak load, where
5This topic has been investigated in several studies, for instance [32]
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prices are highest. Trading flexibility in existing electricity markets does not solve the
capacity problems of the grid companies, but retailers and wind power producers can
indirectly gain from lower regulating prices. Bids of flexibility in Elspot is expected to
decrease the average spot price, and hence retailers, as buyers in this market, will gain
from this while wind power producers, as suppliers in this market, will face revenue
losses. As discussed in Subsection 6.3.4 the Reserve Option Market provides the highest
profit for an aggregator as he receives an option premium regardless of the volume of
submitted bids.
Due to the fact that the aggregator must ensure su cient flexibility available in all
agreements he will not be able to bind up large volumes in the Reserves Option Mar-
ket and at the same time engage in long-term contracts on large volumes with a grid
company. Hence, the aggregator could specialize on one core business and find smart
solutions to utilize excess flexibility in every hour. One opportunity is to engage in short-
term contracts with retailers or wind power producers, or trade the excess flexibility in
existing electricity markets or separate flexibility markets. Research has suggested that
new separate flexibility markets will arise. It is, however, uncertain wether an aggregator
will exist within such market but if the aggregator can act as a monopoly in a flexibility
market this will be even more profitable than contracts.
6.4.2 Illustrative study of a combined business model
The profits from di↵erent business models are compared by performing simple estimates.
The calculations are based on an available volume of 5 000 kW flexibility in a specific
hour, like in the calculations in Subsection 6.3.4. Thus the costs related to the flexibil-
ity portfolio are equal in both trading methods, making the results comparable. The
flexibility is aggregated from 5 000 households in which can reduce 1 kW each in the
specified hour. The two-part linear contract applied in the calculations is presented in
Subsection 6.2.2.
Table 6.3: Contracts between the aggregator and the buyers of flexibility.
Grid company Wind power producer Retailer
Wholesale price 0,8 0,8 0,8
Lump sum 33 803 -63 867
Revenue aggregator 37 765 3 899 4 829
As seen from Table 6.3 the lump sum in the two-part linear contract between aggregator
and wind power producer is negative due to profits lower than their reservation profits.
Additionally, the profit obtained in a contract with a retailer or wind power producer
is substantially lower than in the contract with the grid company. The profit from
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contracting with a grid company yields the overall highest profit from the all alterna-
tives investigated, while trading in the Reserve Option Market yields the second highest
profit. Based on the calculations the aggregator will prefer to engage in a long-term
contract with a grid company when having a limited volume of flexibility available, and
supplement with trading excess flexibility in the electricity markets as this has proved
to be profitable.
6.5 Local Flexibility Markets
As stated, grid companies need flexibility from geographic specific suppliers in order
to solve various capacity and reliability problems in the distribution grid, which brings
along a need to granulate the demand and supply in local areas. The authors of [14] and
[15] illustrates mathematically how customer groups can be defined to address the local
need for flexibility. In order for grid companies to buy flexibility in a separate market
the market operator can match flexibility demanded from a specific supplier group with
supply from the same group. It would be possible to have one large flexibility market in
Norway divided in fine-grained supplier groups corresponding to each buyer. However,
the market clearing would probably be too complex and lead to ine cient outcomes. In
lieu of one large market, multiple local markets could balance demand and supply in each
supplier groups in a more e cient way. The market clearing model for local flexibility
markets is based on the models derived in [14] and [15] but with some modifications.
The models in these articles treats flexibility as a public good, whereas the flexibility in
this thesis is looked upon as a private good. The customer groups are called supplier
groups here since electricity customers are suppliers of flexibility. If grid companies are
the buyers, a supplier group includes all suppliers connected to a common load point of
a feeder at a distribution level. In case of a retailer, a group can consist of all suppliers
within the same price area in Elspot, or of all the suppliers with the same electricity
supply contract.
6.5.1 Market clearing of a local market
The market clearing of a local flexibility market should be Pareto optimal. Scheduling a
resource, i.e. flexibility, for a number of agents is Pareto optimal if no change from this
schedule can increase benefit for one agent without reducing benefits for other agents
[14]. To reach Pareto optimality, the following maximization problem must be solved
max
8<:
JX
j=1
Bj  
SX
s=1
Cs
9=; (6.32)
Equation (6.32) states that a flexibility schedule is Pareto optimal if the total surplus
derived from this schedule for all agents together is maximized. Here Bj is the total
benefit for buyer j and Cs is the total cost of producing flexibility for supplier s. The
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individual benefits taking supplier groups into account is given by
Bj =
NjX
n=1
  ↵j,ny2j,n +  j,nyj,n  8j 2 J (6.33)
Each buyer involves a corresponding set of supplier groups. Equation (6.33) implies
that the total benefit for each buyer is the sum of the benefits from each supplier group
n. ↵j,n and  j,n are the valuation coe cient and are individual for each buyer and for
flexibility supplied by each supplier group. For a grid company it is reasonable to assume
that flexibility from suppliers in a specific location is more valuable than flexibility from
other locations as they solve di↵erent problems. yj,n is the total amount of flexibility
demanded by buyer j from supplier group n. Buyers demand this aggregated amount
of flexibility from a group of suppliers but do not need to know exactly which suppliers
were the providers. The suppliers’ individual costs of providing flexibility is defined by
Cs =
JX
j=1
asx
2
j,s + bs(1  ✓s)xj,s 8s 2 S (6.34)
Equation (6.34) illustrates that the cost for each supplier is defined as each single sup-
plier’s cost function with individual cost coe cients as and bs as well as a willingness
parameter ✓s like before. xj,s is the amount of flexibility that supplier s provides to
buyer j. The benefit for the buyers depends on both the supplier group and the buyer.
Consequently, the market clearing will result in di↵erent market prices dependent on j
and n. This is a form of price discrimination, and it is not clear if such pricing will be
accepted by the Competition Authorities in the future. However, this model will assume
that prices can di↵er between and within supplier groups.
To ensure that demand of flexibility equals supply in each supplier group, a constraint
for the demand-supply-balance must be included in the market clearing
yj,n =
SX
s=1
uj,ns xj,s 8j 2 J, 8n 2 Nj (6.35)
The left-hand side of (6.35) is the aggregated amount of flexibility demanded by buyer
j from supplier group n. On the right-hand side all the individual volumes of flexibility
xj,s from the suppliers included in each supplier group are summed up to find aggregated
supply. uj,ns is a binary coe cient that represent the relational status of each supplier s
to group n, which is 1 if the supplier is included in group n, and 0 otherwise. Market
price for buyer j and supplier group n is found from each buyer’s demand curve at the
given volume of flexibility yj,n
pj,n(yj,n) =  2↵j,nyj,n +  j,n (6.36)
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If several buyers demand flexibility from the same suppliers6 in an hour the total cost
of supplying the flexibility is calculated based on the total demanded flexibility from
all buyers. Consequently, the costs will be higher than they are in reality as the same
flexibility could be procured by several buyers without raising the costs if they are
supplied by the same suppliers. As the market clearing maximizes overall benefit only
the buyer with highest benefit in each supplier group will buy flexibility. The profit for
buyer j becomes
⇡j =
NjX
n=1
  ↵j,ny2j,n +  j,nyj,n   pj,nyj,n  8j 2 J (6.37)
The supplier profit on the other hand is given by
⇡s =
JX
j=1
 
pj,sxj,s   asx2j,s   bs(1  ✓s)xj,s
  8s 2 S (6.38)
From the perspective of each market participant this model proposes sub-optimal out-
comes. If buyers could collectively pay for the flexibility that several buyers demand
their cost would reduce and buyers with lower benefits could buy more of the flexibility
needed to solve various problems. A local market clearing is illustrated with a small test
system in the following subsection, followed by a proposed solution to a more e cient
scheduling of this resource.
6.5.2 Illustrative study of a local flexibility market
A test system consisting of 20 suppliers of various types, one grid company with two dif-
ferent supplier groups and one retailer with one supplier group including all the suppliers
is used to illustrate a local flexibility market as shown in Figure 6.5. It is assumed that
all suppliers and buyers in the test system have access to the market. The grid company
value the flexibility from both supplier groups equally, hence the valuation coe cients
are the same in both groups. However, the groups consist of di↵erent supplier types who
have di↵erent costs of providing flexibility. The retailer’s benefit is given by the benefit
function described in Section 3.4 for a future scenario with high imbalance costs. The
model is solved by using a nonlinear solver in Excel. The valuation coe cients estimated
in Section 3.4 are scaled down for both the retailer and the grid company in order to
represent benefit of a local problem matching the low supply in the test system. Note
that the results for this reason are not directly comparable with the numerical results in
Chapter 4 and 5.
Table 6.4 shows the results of the optimization. Given the grid company’s high estimated
benefit of procuring flexibility he want to buy a large volume of flexibility to a higher
price than the retailer with lower benefit. Thus, only the grid company buys flexibility
6Supplier groups may overlap so that one supplier is represented in several supplier groups.
87
CHAPTER 6. NOVEL BUSINESS MODELS FOR FLEXIBILITY
SUPPLIER 
1 – 7 
SUPPLIER 
8 – 17 
Grid Company 
SUPPLIER 
18 – 20 
Retailer 
Figure 6.5: Test system for a local flexibility market.
from the suppliers in overlapping supplier groups. Consequently, the retailer only buys
flexibility from the three suppliers not included in any of the two supplier groups related
to the grid company. Since it is assumed in this test system that both buyers need
flexibility in the same hour, the retailer would procure less than if the grid company did
not procure any flexibility in the given hour, thus increasing the supply that the retailer
could buy. In reality, buyers may not necessarily demand flexibility from the same lo-
cations in the exact same hours as they have di↵erent problems to solve. Nevertheless,
as some challenges might be related to each other the same flexibility will sometimes be
demanded at the same time period, and a flexibility market should address this in the
market clearing in order to reach e ciency.
Table 6.4: Results from the simulation of a local flexibility market with supplier groups.
Grid company Retailer
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1
Volume [kW] 102 184 9
Price [NOK/kW] 6,60 6,51 4,72
Profit [NOK] 1 895 45
6.5.3 Flexibility as a public good
So far in this thesis flexibility has been treated as a private good benefiting only the ac-
tor buying flexibility. However, flexibility is a special type of commodity that is closely
linked to the electricity market and can influence other actors in the electricity system
regardless if they are participants in the flexibility market. Often the buyers will de-
mand flexibility in di↵erent hours depending on their problems. Sometimes, however,
they might demand flexibility from the same geographic area and in the same hour. For
instance, if a grid company and a retailer demand 5 MW reduced electricity in the same
hour and from the same suppliers, the suppliers only need to reduce 5 MW in total to
meet the demand from both buyers. When the flexibility is treated as a private good
both buyers would pay for the same commodity. From a socio-economic point of view
this is ine cient. A possible way of addressing this e ciency problem is to treat flexi-
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bility as a public good that is jointly used by several independent buyers in given hours.
In contrast bilateral contracts fail to address the problem as the various contractual re-
lationships are not coordinated, and each bilateral contract optimizes individual profits.
The authors in [14] and [15] propose two di↵erent market clearing methods in a sep-
arated flexibility market where they treat flexibility as a public good. [14] defines a
pool-based market clearing scheme including a constraint related to the contribution
percentage each buyer has to pay when the flexibility is jointly used. These contri-
butions must be specified in an assurance contract which is a financial mechanism for
guaranteeing an e cient provision of the public good [14]. How much each buyer should
contribute to the payment of flexibility depends on the benefit this buyer receives from
the flexibility bought.
In [15], the same authors develop an alternative decentralized market clearing scheme
called agent-based. In this scheme, each market participant is assumed to be an ”eco-
nomic agent” that only maximizes own benefit based on information about actions taken
by others agents. The strength of this model compared to the pool-based model is that
it does not include contribution rates and the agents are not required to submit demand
and supply curves which can be di cult to predict. The market clearing scheme employ
Walrasian auctions, in which multi-round demand-supply balancing price adjustments
takes place [6]. The market operator adjusts the prices of flexibility in each round to
converge supply and demand to the market equilibrium point. The iterative auction
can be modeled with a taˆtonnement process, which is a form of hill-climbing algorithm
proposed by Walras [6].
In order for local flexibility markets to function well and be e cient in an economic
perspective, it might be necessary to consider flexibility as a public resource. Further
analysis and modeling must examine which players should contribute with payments for
flexibility when more than one buyer demand the same resource7. The proposed model
in [15] is a suitable basis for further investigations related to local flexibility markets.
However, the model could also consider how payments could be divided when some
participants procuring flexibility influence other agents in a negative way.
6.5.4 Aggregator participating in local markets
Sophisticated systems automating the supply of flexibility into these local markets can
obviously diminish aggregators importance. If these systems manage to provide flexibil-
ity at a lower cost and more e ciently than intermediary actors, and at the same time
release the full potential of flexibility, aggregators will be redundant in the long run in
an economic perspective. However, other factors must be considered as well. First, var-
ious market barriers can hinder small suppliers to participate in the flexibility markets
like high transaction costs and participation fees. As the activation of flexibility a↵ect
7Flexibility demanded from the same suppliers in a time period
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other than the participant buying or selling the resource, balance responsibility is crucial
to secure reliability in the energy system. Thus, each supplier of flexibility in the local
market should be a balance responsible party or having an agreement with another actor
possessing this role. As it is not realistic that small suppliers are balance responsible
parties, they are dependent upon other actors in order to supply flexibility in the mar-
ket which might prevent participation. Additionally, costly investments are required to
install the sophisticated systems needed to automate the supply into the market. Small
suppliers are less willing to incur these costs than larger actors. An aggregator may have
larger opportunities for extracting profits from flexibility, and for that reason he could
be willing to invest in systems needed. Aggregators specializing in innovative flexibility
products as their core businesses are capable of providing flexibility services to a lower
marginal cost than other actors.
From a broader perspective, several options for aggregators to participate in local flex-
ibility markets exist. The development of new technology, suppliers’ behavior and the
division of roles in the future energy markets are key factors to determine design of new
flexibility markets. Competition among aggregators is especially important in local mar-
kets in order to prevent ine cient trading of flexibility, as it may be easier to exercise
market power in a local market.
6.6 Future Solutions for Flexibility
Various solutions for activating flexibility and allocating the value of this resource have
been presented. Major changes in the electricity system are required in order to exploit
the proposed business models. [8] indicates that these changes will be a gradually process.
A number of factors will influence the way trading of flexibility is introduced to the
energy markets and the division of new and existing roles, both for short-term and
long-term adaptions. Based on the analyses throughout the thesis this section briefly
propose solutions to utilize various business models and discuss long-term adaptions in
the electricity system.
6.6.1 Gradually introducing flexibility as a resource
The transition to a market dealing with present and future challenges is a comprehensive
process which require several adaptions. The first phase of this transition should focus
on making flexible consumption of electricity interesting for individual suppliers. In this
phase only a small subset of buyers and suppliers will realize the value of flexibility [8],
hence small volumes of flexibility will be traded. Contractual relationships will be a
natural way of trading flexibility in an early transition phase. As mentioned, aggrega-
tors might be the necessary driving force to attract suppliers to participate. Flexibility
markets will most likely not be formed at this stage. Moreover, few suppliers have in-
stalled advanced control systems necessary to bid directly into a market in this phase.
For these reasons the authors believe that aggregators will be key roles in the early
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transition phase. Large industry and commercial suppliers can contract directly with
buyers whereas households are more dependent on aggregators. Based on the analyses
of various contract types, a nonlinear incentive compatible contract is proposed for the
aggregator to activate flexibility from suppliers. Suppliers select a suitable volume of
flexibility they are willing to provide to the aggregator for a given payment from a large
menu. In return, the aggregator controls and manage their loads. The suppliers can
restrict the loads to be controlled. In addition, the aggregators should o↵er innovative
services to make the flexibility resource more attractive to suppliers. The contracts
should distinguish between available flexibility and actual activated flexibility with an
attached payment schedule. For instance, aggregators can o↵er a service in return for
available flexibility and pay the contracted price for activated flexibility.
Aggregators have to engage in bilateral contracts with the buyers as well, and as in-
dicated by the analyses a two-part linear contract is a suitable alternative for the aggre-
gator to extract profit, and simultaneously the optimal value chain profit is obtained.
The buyers must pay a wholesale price for each volume of flexibility they demand from
the aggregator as well as a fixed payment, and it should be agreed in this contract as well
whether the buyers must pay for all available flexibility or the activated flexibility. The
latter reduces the risk for buyers, making it easier for them to participate. The lump
sum payment could be used to pay for having a certain amount of flexibility available
at given times while the wholesale price pays for activated flexibility. Bargaining power
will decide the allocation of profits among the participants. As buyers may not be aware
of the value of flexibility in the beginning, it is reasonable to assume that the aggregator
cannot extract the whole value chain profit and must give the buyers attractive o↵ers.
For instance a grid company may demand a risk premium for postponing investments
as there is uncertainty and thus higher risks involved. The contracts can typically be
individually tailored rather than being standard contracts in this phase [8].
When more flexibility is mobilized and multiple buyers become aware of the value of
flexibility a market place can evolve. In a market place the opportunities of flexibility
becomes apparent and makes it easier for buyers and suppliers to trade flexibility. This
will also increase the transparency and the competition among flexibility traders, mak-
ing the trading more e cient. For a relatively new traded resource it is important that
participants have easy access to the resource. Thus, a market place is an important step
for making flexibility available. Existing electricity markets can be an additional market
place for trading flexibility. The existing market barriers should be removed for this
to happen, making it possible for new entrants to submit bids of flexibility into these
markets. As discussed in Section 6.3, an aggregator might extract profits from trading
in the Reserve Option market. If the aggregator possesses a large flexibility portfolio he
can exploit a combined business model where contractual relationships are the primary
source of income and trading in existing markets serve as a supplementary income source.
The transition phase can eventually lead to creation of new markets for trading well
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defined flexibility products with large market volumes. Local markets defined in Section
6.5 will provide flexibility to all potential buyers. The local dependency of grid compa-
nies’ challenges are addressed by these markets and the market operator can serve as
the coordinating role instead of the aggregator. Unlike an aggregator, a market operator
tries to maximize total market benefit. Thus, trading flexibility through markets will
in most cases lead to more e cient outcomes than bilateral contracts coordinated by
aggregators.
6.6.2 Long term market adaptions
Existing electricity markets and separate flexibility markets are designed for di↵erent
purposes. Whereas the existing markets intend to trade electricity and secure electricity
reserves, flexibility markets aim to provide flexibility to the system by letting all poten-
tial buyers and suppliers participate. Flexibility is a virtual resource physically linked
to electricity, hence the markets a↵ect each other. Nevertheless, they are not necessary
capable to combine in one market which brings along an interesting aspect: how can
both markets exist in the long run?
Three key factors a↵ect the long-term existence of parallel markets in the electricity
system. First, the prices in the existing electricity markets and the local flexibility mar-
kets are of importance. A large gap in the prices may exclude one of the markets. For
instance, if the flexibility markets operate with significantly higher prices than the elec-
tricity prices few buyers are interesting in procuring flexibility. Some buyers, however,
value the flexibility high enough to trade in the flexibility market if they do not have
access to flexibility from other trading methods which leads to the second key factor.
Barriers of market access prevent certain actors to freely participate in all markets. If
some buyers and suppliers do not have access to provide flexibility in electricity mar-
kets this indicates a need for a separate market. Without an intermediary party like
an aggregator or a retailer, small suppliers can realistically be excluded from electricity
markets due to certain barriers. Finally, balancing of the electricity system is crucial and
the parallel markets must secure balance in order for both of them to exist as electricity
and flexibility is physically linked. If flexibility is activated in a flexibility market, this
a↵ects the electricity balance of the system. Hence the markets must be coupled and
should be operated synchronously. Coupling the markets ensures that the flexibility is
employed where it o↵ers the most value, and the same resource can be activated for
di↵erent purposes in the power system while inducing both private earnings and the
economy at large.
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Conclusion
The main scope of this thesis has been to present and analyze methods for trading de-
mand side flexibility, including all participants willing to supply or buy flexibility. In
order to do so, factors a↵ecting the overall e ciency of various business models, like
benefits, costs and divisions of power between actors, have been analyzed. The quan-
tification of costs and benefits associated with flexibility served as a basis in the design
of business models. Although the costs and benefits are only estimates, they illustrate
important trends consistent with other research. The results clearly indicated that grid
companies possess largest potential of exploiting flexibility as this resource can solve the
majority of future problems in the distribution grids. This allocation of benefits have
great influence on contractual and market-based approaches of trading as the gap can
prevent other actors from trading flexibility and restrict the potential of value creation.
For a retailer, the flexibility can be more profitable than illustrated in this thesis by
undertaking the role of an aggregator. Doing so, the retailer can optimize his existing
customer portfolio. The analyses performed implied insu cient gains for the wind power
producer from procuring flexibility in both a present and future scenario. Additionally,
as a producer he will incur lower income following from decreasing average electricity
prices when flexibility is introduced to the system. Consequently, the producer should
rather focus on optimizing bids in the electricity market.
The analyses of contractual trading of flexibility confirmed the importance of contracts
in the power market. Contracts can serve as tools for extracting flexibility from suppli-
ers and provide tailored solutions to overcome challenges in the electricity system. As
the grid companies postpone long-term investments when exploiting flexibility they need
reliable supply of the resource throughout the period, in which a tailored contract can
facilitate. However, tailored contracts are harder to achieve with small suppliers, bring-
ing along a need for an intermediary party. Contracts with small suppliers, typically
households, can be standardized to reduce transaction costs as long as they are incen-
tive compatible. On the other hand, additional services are required to make flexibility
interesting for suppliers. In light of the analyzed contracts, uncertainty and uneven
distribution of information a↵ect both the overall e ciency of the trading as well as
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the distribution of profits. Risk preferences are decisive for the design of contracts and
the participating actors. With uncertainty present a risk averse retailer or wind power
producer may prefer to trade in a market in lieu of binding volumes of flexibility in a con-
tract with long duration. For grid companies on the other hand, uncertainty can prevent
them from trading in markets as both the available volume of flexibility and the mar-
ket price are uncertain, involving higher risks compared to a specified long-term contract.
In contrast to bilateral contracts, the analysis of flexibility markets suggested that flex-
ibility can be traded more e ciently in a market. A flexibility market opens up for
trading by a larger number of participants and by doing so utilizing the potential of
flexibility in a better way. However, trading in a separate flexibility market requires
significant adaptions to overcome challenges as geographical locations, price discrimi-
nation and connection to the electricity market since the two resources are physically
linked. Both benefits of procuring flexibility and the division of market power clearly
a↵ect e ciency of the market and participating actors. The calculations illustrated that
actors with significantly higher profits than others force the market price up and pre-
vent potential buyers to participate. This e↵ect is enhanced if few buyers dominate the
market like grid companies possibly are capable of. A large aggregator can modify the
division of power in the value chain by reducing the dominating role of grid companies.
Simultaneously, the aggregator serves as a driving force to attract small suppliers, in-
creasing the competition in the trade of flexibility.
The analyses also emphasized the implication of flexibility as a jointly consumed com-
modity. As the same flexibility can be procured by multiple buyers the design of business
models must account for this in order to reach e ciency. The market-based approach of
trading can handle this by coordinating payments for the same resources, thus increasing
the demand. The local flexibility market modeled in this thesis does not address this
problem, but as suggested in other research treating flexibility as a public good is a way
to facilitate e cient trading in a local market. Bilateral contracts tend to fail coordi-
nating jointly consumed flexibility. An aggregator can take advantage of this by selling
the same resource to multiple buyers through contracts. This will harm the competition
and decrease social surplus.
As the analyses throughout the thesis suggest, both flexibility markets and bilateral
contracts are important for future trading of demand side flexibility and should be thor-
oughly investigated in further research. Greater attention on the change of new and
existing actors as well as the interactions between them will be necessary to release the
full potential of flexibility. The proposed business models in this thesis add knowledge
about how demand side flexibility, as a new resource, can be integrated in the electricity
system and simultaneously create value for multiple participants. This thesis forms a
basis for further research of contract and market design in the power market. Compre-
hensive load scheduling models for buyers or intermediary parties ought to be studied in
more detail. Previous load scheduling models have focused on trading in existing mar-
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kets, thus future research is recommended to incorporate contract design with suppliers
and additionally investigate the possibility of trading in flexibility markets. The design
and functionality of separate flexibility markets need to be examined in more detail.
Furthermore, innovative solutions and services for intermediary parties should be stud-
ied. In parallel with further research Authorities are strongly advised to facilitate use
of demand side flexibility in the electricity system and should also help enlighten actors
about the value of flexibility.
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Appendices
A.1 Data files with calculations
Excel-files containing all calculations are submitted together with the Master’s Thesis
to the DAIM database used by NTNU for submission of Master’s theses. The following
files are attached:
• 3 Cost Functions.xlsx
• 3 Benefit Functions.xlsx
• 4 Contract Design.xlsx
• 5 Separate Flexibility Market.xlsx
• 6 Novel Business Models.xlsx
A.2 Input data for regression analyses
This Appendix presents tables with input data for the regression analyses performed in
Chapter 3. The analyses are performed by using the Curve fitting tool in MATLAB.
Table A.1: Inputdata for the regression analysis for an industry supplier.
Curtailed load [kW] Cost [NOK]
0 0
46 92
92 369
138 830
184 1 476
230 2 306
278 3 279
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Table A.2: Inputdata for the regression analysis for a commercial business supplier.
Curtailed load [kW] Cost [NOK]
0,0 0,0
3,8 13
7,6 50
11,4 113
15,2 202
19,0 315
23,0 449
Table A.3: Inputdata for the regression analysis for a household supplier.
Curtailed load [kW] Cost [NOK]
0,0 0,0
0,67 0,3
1,34 1,4
2,01 3,1
2,68 5,5
3,35 8,6
4 12,0
Table A.4: Inputdata for the regression analysis for a grid company.
Available flexibility [kW]
Share of postponed
investment [%]
Years postponed Value gain [NOK]
0 0 0 0
1 000 20 5 12 336
2 000 35 6 25 309
6 000 70 9 70 883
11 000 90 10 99 007
20 000 100 11 118 338
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Table A.5: Inputdata for the regression analysis for a wind power producer in a present
scenario.
Available flexibility [kW]
Share of reduced
imbalance cost [%]
Benefit [NOK]
0 0 0
750 30 414
1 500 50 690
3 075 80 1 104
5 025 95 1 311
7 500 100 1 380
Table A.6: Inputdata for the regression analysis for a wind power producer in a future
scenario.
Available flexibility [kW]
Share of reduced
imbalance cost [%]
Benefit [NOK]
0 0 0
750 30 783
1 500 50 1 305
3 075 80 2 087
5 025 95 2 479
7 500 100 2 609
Table A.7: Inputdata for the regression analysis for a retailer in a present scenario.
Available flexibility [kW]
Share of reduced
imbalance cost [%]
Benefit [NOK]
0 0 0
300 30 685
600 55 1 256
1 050 80 1 827
1 650 95 2 169
2 250 100 2 283
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Table A.8: Inputdata for the regression analysis for a retailer in a future scenario.
Available flexibility [kW]
Share of reduced
imbalance cost [%]
Benefit [NOK]
0 0 0
300 30 1 370
600 55 2 511
1 050 80 3 653
1 650 95 4 338
2 250 100 4 566
A.3 Additional calculations and derived expressions
This Appendix contains additional calculations and derived expressions for Chapter 4.
A.3.1 One-part linear contract under uncertainty
The expected profit of the buyer:
E↵,  [⇡B,U2] =
(E[ ]  b(1  ✓))2
4(E[↵] + 2a)
(7.1)
Actual profit obtained by the buyer:
⇡B,U2 =
(b(1  ✓)(12↵  a  E[↵]) + a(2    E[ ])  12↵E[ ] +  E[↵])(E[ ]  b(1  ✓))
2(E[↵] + 2a)2
(7.2)
The profit of the supplier:
⇡S,U2 =
a(E[ ]  b(1  ✓))2
4(E[↵] + 2a)2
(7.3)
A.3.2 Two-part linear contract under uncertainty
The expected profit of the buyer:
E↵,  [⇡B,U3] =
(b(1  ✓)  E[ ])2
4(E[↵] + a)
  ⇡ S (7.4)
Actual profit obtained by the buyer:
⇡B,U3 =
(    b(1  ✓))(E[ ]  b(1  ✓))
2(a+ E[↵]
  (↵+ a)(E[ ]  b(1  ✓))
2
4(a+ E[↵])2
  ⇡ S (7.5)
The profit of the supplier:
⇡S = ⇡
 
S (7.6)
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A.3.3 Profit-sharing contract under asymmetric information
The buyer’s maximization problem:
max
x
E✓[⇡B,A1(x)] = E✓[( ↵x2 +  x  ax2   b(1  ✓)x)⇢]
= ⇢
Z ✓
✓¯
 ↵x2 +  x  ax2   b(1  ✓)x dF(✓)
(7.7)
The supplier’s maximization problem:
max
x
E✓[⇡S,A1(x)] = E✓[( ↵x2 +  x  ax2   b(1  ✓)x)(1  ⇢)]
= (1  ⇢)
Z ✓
✓¯
 ↵x2 +  x  ax2   b(1  ✓)x dF(✓)
(7.8)
Optimal volume of flexibility:
x*A1 =
    b(1  E|✓])
2(a+ ↵)
(7.9)
Expected value chain profit:
E✓[⇡V C,A1] =
(b(1  E[✓])   )2
4(a+ ↵)
(7.10)
The profit of the buyer:
⇡B,A1 = E✓[⇡V C,A1]⇢ (7.11)
A.3.4 Two-part linear contract under asymmetric information
Expected buyer profit is given by:
E✓[⇡B,A3] = E✓[ ↵x2A2 +  xA2   w*A2x  L*A3] (7.12)
The actual buyer profit:
⇡B,A3 =  ↵x2A2 +  xA2   w*A2x  L*A3 (7.13)
The supplier’s profit:
⇡S,A3 =
(b(1  ✓)  b(1  ✓¯))(b(1  ✓) + 3b(1  ✓¯)  2    2b(1  E[✓]))a
4a(a+ ↵)
+
↵(b(1  ✓)  b(1  ✓¯)(b(1  ✓)  2b(1  E[✓]) + b(1  ✓¯))
4a(a+ ↵)
(7.14)
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A.3.5 Nonlinear contract under asymmetric information
The first-best best outputs are given by the following first-order conditions:
dB(x⇤)
dx⇤
= 2ax⇤ + b(1  ✓) (7.15)
and
dB(x¯⇤)
dx¯⇤
= 2ax¯⇤ + b(1  ✓¯) (7.16)
The e cient output of flexibility:
x⇤ =
    b(1  ✓)
2(↵+ a)
(7.17)
x¯⇤ =
    b(1  ✓¯)
2(↵+ a)
(7.18)
The supplier’s participation constraints:
y   ax2   b(1  ✓)x   ⇡ S (7.19)
y¯   ax¯2   b(1  ✓¯)x¯   ⇡¯ S (7.20)
Here y is the incentive payment to the supplier for a given volume of x delivered. This
payment schedule vary with the supplier type ✓. The optimal payments are given by
y* = ax2 + b(1   ✓)x and y¯* = ax¯2 + b(1   ✓¯)x¯ for the e cient and ine cient supplier
respectively. This solution provides a benchmark for the solution under asymmetric
information.
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